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INTRODUCTION
M UCH of the economic literature on Alternative Dispute Res-
olution ("ADR") displays a surprising failure to differentiate
between types of dispute resolution devices. Often when econo-
mists purport to examine the efficiency of ADR, they focus exclu-
sively on arbitration or other forms of private adjudication.'
Mediation-negotiation facilitated by a neutral third party-has
received far less attention than arbitration in the economic litera-
ture. The neglect of mediation is particularly surprising because
mediation is more "alternative" than arbitration. Arbitration (in
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1 For examples of articles that purport to discuss alternative dispute resolution in
general, but in fact focus on private adjudication, see Lisa Bernstein, Understanding the
Limits of Court-Connected ADR: A Critique of Federal Court-Annexed Arbitration
Programs, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2169 (1993); Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution:
An Economic Analysis (1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law
Review Association).
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both its binding and nonbinding forms) asks the arbitrator to repli-
cate the decision of a court.2 A mediator, by contrast, stops short
of recommending how the dispute should be resolved.3 By focus-
ing on arbitration when they examine ADR, economists have
failed to provide a coherent rationale for mediation.
The ADR literature has succeeded in fleshing out noneconomic
explanations for mediation. Robert Mnookin and Lee Ross, for
example, have suggested several ways in which a mediator might
overcome psychological barriers to conflict resolution, but they
have not explained how a mediator might overcome the barriers
created by the strategic interaction of two rational, self-interested
negotiators.4 We agree that mediators are valuable in helping par-
ties overcome a broad variety of psychological barriers. The goal
of this Article, however, is to identify how mediation also could
increase the efficiency of bargaining from an economic or strategic
perspective.
This Article explores how mediators (acting specifically as
mediators, rather than as adjudicators or advisors) can create value
in negotiations between rational actors. Mediators in practice pro-
vide a number of services.5 Many of these services, however, could
2 Binding arbitration simply attempts to replace a public adjudicator with a lower-cost
private adjudicator. See Shavell, supra note 1, at 12. In some cases, parties to an
arbitration may supply the arbitrator with a rule different from the one a court would
apply, but the basic act of adjudicating the case according to a preexisting, external
standard replicates a court's adjudicative function. And while the private parties are at
liberty to ignore the decision in nonbinding arbitration, the arbitrator's task there also is
often to replicate the decision (although not the process) of a court.
3 See Gerald W. Cormick, The "Theory" and Practice of Environmental Mediation, 2
Envtl. Prof. 24, 27 (1980) (quoting the Office of Environmental Mediation's definition of
mediation as a "'voluntary process in which those involved in a dispute jointly explore and
reconcile their differences. The mediator has no authority to impose a settlement."');
Roberta S. Mitchell & Scot E. Dewhirst, The Mediator Handbook: A Training Guide to
Mediation Techniques and Skills 3 (1990) (describing mediation as "organized
negotiation," a "voluntary dispute resolving process in which a third-party facilitates and
coordinates the negotiations of disputing parties") (emphasis omitted).
4 See Robert H. Mnookin & Lee Ross, Introduction, in Barriers to the Negotiated
Resolution of Conflict 1 (Kenneth Arrow, Robert H. Mnookin, Lee Ross, Amos Tversky
& Robert Wilson eds., forthcoming 1994); see also Robert Mnookin, Why Negotiations
Fail: An Exploration of Barriers to the Resolution of Conflict, 8 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol.
235, 248-49 (1993) (discussing how mediation can overcome psychological barriers without
specifically addressing rational, self-interested parties).
5 See Stephen P. Doyle & Roger S. Haydock, Without the Punches: Resolving Disputes
Without Litigation 88-92 (1991) (stating that mediators can use a variety of tactics and
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be performed by advocates, advisors or neutral third-party adjudi-
cators. For example, commentators often note that an important
function of the mediator is to serve as a "reality check" or "agent
of reality" who impresses upon the parties the costs of failing to
reach a negotiated agreement.6 But such a function could be per-
formed equally well by a nonbinding arbitrator working with public
information (and performing a reality check in the presence of
both parties) or by an expert advisor working with private informa-
tion (and delivering the bad news privately). We believe that
mediators create value by providing reality checks and other serv-
ices, but that these services are not uniquely mediative and thus do
not adequately explain mediation.
We focus instead on how mediators resolve disputes by "caucus-
ing" privately with the individual disputants.7 Sequential caucusing
techniques during a mediation, including the following: determining the needs, interests,
and values of each party; identifying issues; probing positions; caucusing with the parties;
engaging in "shuttle" diplomacy; exchanging information; maintaining civility; establishing
an agenda; encouraging communication; retaining confidential information; providing a
different perspective; suggesting strategic and tactical approaches; exploring options;
proposing an innovative remedy; offering opinions regarding the issues; seeking joint gains;
declaring an impasse; and imposing a cooling off period); Howard Raiffa, The Art and
Science of Negotiation 108-09 (1982) (stating that "third-party intervention" can assist
negotiators by: bringing the parties together; establishing a constructive ambience for
negotiation; collecting and judiciously communicating select confidential material; helping
the parties clarify their values and derive responsible reservation prices; deflating
unreasonable claims and loosening commitments; seeking joint gains; keeping negotiations
going; and articulating the rationale for agreement); Linda R. Singer, Settling Disputes:
Conflict Resolution in Business, Families, and the Legal System 20 (1990) (stating that
"[a]n impartial umpire may be able to get negotiations back on track" by: "soothing ruffled
feelings"; "acting as a neutral discussion leader and ensuring that all the parties have ample
opportunity to speak"; "helping to distinguish interests from positions"; "working with the
parties to devise creative solutions for meeting their needs"; "earning enough of the
parties' trust that they will share confidential information about their interests and
alternatives"; "communicating selected information back and forth, often translating it
from negative to positive language"; "serving as an agent of reality, helping the parties to
be more realistic about their alternatives to agreement"; "keeping negotiations going when
the parties are ready to give up"; and "acting as a scapegoat when things go wrong").
6 See, e.g., Doyle & Haydock, supra note 5, at 91; Nancy H. Rogers & Craig A.
McEwen, Mediation: Law, Policy, Practice 9 (1989); Singer, supra note 5, at 20.
7 A "caucus" is a private meeting between the mediator and one of the parties that takes
place at some point in the course of the mediation. The purposes of caucusing have been
variously described:
They are used to: provide an opportunity for a party to vent and cool down when
emotions flare; encourage candor and get to the root of the dispute; clarify an issue;
spend time along [sic] with a party to build trust; provide time to review the issues
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is uniquely mediative: arbitrators generally do not conduct ex parte
meetings with the parties and negotiation necessarily requires the
parties to meet together. By shuttling back and forth between
meetings with individual disputants, mediators can collect and dis-
tribute private information. An economic rationale for mediation
centers on caucusing because it is here that the mediator most
clearly controls the flow of information between the disputants.
Although our title refers to "economic rationales for mediation,"
probably a more illuminating description would be "economic
rationales for mediative caucusing."8
ADR theory, however, has been particularly unhelpful in
explaining how caucusing creates value. Although psychological
explanations are offered for caucusing, no one has ventured an
economic or strategic justification for the practice. Why, for
instance, would rational disputants disclose private information to
a mediator that they would not disclose directly to the other side?
And what should mediators do with this information? Mediators
and analysts often claim that the mediator should maintain the
confidentiality of all private communications learned in the caucus.
If confidentiality is scrupulously maintained, however, the media-
tor is doing nothing more than what an advisor individually
retained by each party could do. This extreme form of "Chinese
wall" caucusing thus seems not only a poor example of mediation,
but also an activity that could be more cheaply accomplished by
independent advisors concerned only with one side of the dispute.
and alternatives; encourage movement when a party is unyielding; help a party
determine if a position is realistic; remind a party of the consequences of not
reaching agreement; get information that may help generate or shape new
alternatives; check whether a party has thought through the potential consequences
of a probable agreement or separate one party from the threatening or intimidating
conduct of the other.
Nancy H. Rogers & Richard A. Salem, A Student's Guide to Mediation and the Law 37
(1987); see also Walter A. Maggiolo, Techniques of Mediation 151-52 (1985) (outlining
rules for when a caucus may be useful); Christopher W. Moore, The Mediation Process:
Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict 263-71 (1986) (discussing caucusing). One medi-
ation training manual states that the best cases for caucusing are those "where a confiden-
tial and analytical review of the dispute may cause a party to change his position on
matters crucial to a resolution of the issues." Mitchell & Dewhirst, supra note 3, at 75.
8 Indeed, it is much more difficult to construct economic rationales for face-to-face
mediation. If rational actors are speaking directly to each other, it is difficult to explain
how mediators could create value without alleviating psychological barriers.
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In practice, however, mediators often do make disclosures of pri-
vate information, if only indirectly. By caucusing, for example, the
mediator might "determine whether a zone of agreement exists"9
or "figure out a set of trades that will bring the participants as close
to agreement as they can possibly get."'10 Revealing that there are
gains from trade or that a particular set of trades might be accepta-
ble to the other side has the effect of indirectly disclosing to each
party some of the mediator's private discussions with the other
side. The ADR literature has often failed to acknowledge the ten-
sion between the mediator's duty of confidentiality and the need
for indirect disclosure." Indeed, generally when ADR scholars
have written about confidentiality, the focus has been on whether
the mediation will be privileged from discovery by outsiders, rather
than on the extent to which one party's caucus information can be
disclosed to the other sidej 2 Knowing, however, how a mediator is
allowed to transmit caucus information is not only important in
assessing the ethics of a particular mediator's behavior, but also
determines whether private parties will disclose information and
whether that disclosure will be truthful.'3
This Article's thesis is that mediators can create value by con-
trolling the flow of private information (variously eliminating,
translating, or even creating it) to mitigate adverse selection and
moral hazard. Adverse selection is caused by hidden information
that distorts the terms of a contract; because of adverse selection,
9 William A. Hancock, Alternative Dispute Resolution Techniques § 4.008 (1992).
10 Lawrence Susskind & Jeffrey Cruikshank, Breaking the Impasse: Consensual
Approaches to Resolving Public Disputes 146 (1987).
11 Susskind and Cruikshank, for example, suggest:
A skilled intermediary can, in private meetings with the other participants,
explore whether they would be willing to give up Y and Z in exchange for X. This
might be phrased, "What if I could get them to give up X? Would you trade Y and
Z?" Of course, the neutral already knows that such a trade is possible. He or she
must phrase the question, though, in a what-if format to protect the confidentiality
of the information secured earlier.
Id. at 147. Yet if disputants know how mediators use private information, the use of the
what-if format will not stop disputants from drawing at least broad inferences about what
the other side disclosed.
12 See, e.g., Jonathan M. Hyman, The Model Mediator Confidentiality Rule: A
Commentary, 12 Seton Hall Legis. J. 17 (1988) (analyzing confidentiality issues solely in
terms of outsiders).
13 See infra text accompanying notes 89-92 (discussing the effect of mediation process
on the quality and quantity of private disclosure).
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for example, unhealthy people are more likely than healthy people
to opt for life insurance. 14 Moral hazard is caused by hidden con-
duct; because of moral hazard, insured people are more likely than
uninsured people to take risks.'5 Thus, adverse selection problems
involve hidden precontractual information; moral hazard problems
involve hidden postcontractual conduct. Both adverse selection
and moral hazard are caused by the disputants' ability to hide
information about themselves' 6 or their conduct. Adverse selec-
tion can create inefficiency in negotiation when parties hide infor-
mation about their valuation or other characteristics prior to
agreement.' 7 Moral hazard can create inefficiency when one or
both parties take hidden actions after an agreement that reduce the
joint gains from trade. Moral hazard in the ADR setting is a prob-
lem of coordination,' 8 because the parties' inability to directly
observe each other's postcontractual conduct makes it difficult for
the parties to coordinate their performance.
Sequential caucusing is particularly adept at responding to infor-
mational problems because it is a uniquely mediative way to elicit
and channel private information. This Article shows how
mediators can reduce adverse selection in three ways:
(1) by committing parties to break off negotiations when private
representations to a mediator indicate that there are no gains from
trade;
(2) by committing parties to equally divide the gains from trade;
and
(3) by committing to send noisy translations of information dis-
closed during private caucuses.
14 See David M. Kreps, A Course in Microeconomic Theory 577 (1990) ("A classic
example [of adverse selection] is life insurance, where the insuree may know things about
the state of her health that are unknown by the insurer.").
15 See id. ("A classic example [of moral hazard] is fire insurance, where the insuree may
or may not exhibit sufficient care while storing flammable materials.").
16 As the economic literature does generally, we refer to this ability to hide information
as the creation of "informational asymmetries" or "asymmetric information."
17 See Peter C. Cramton, Bargaining with Incomplete Information: An Infinite-Horizon
Model with Two-Sided Uncertainty, 51 Rev. Econ. Stud. 579, 581 (1984).
18 Game theorists have formally analyzed "coordination" games in which the parties
have a common interest in coordinating their behavior in order to increase their individual
payoffs. See Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, Game Theory 18-23 (1991).
[Vol. 80:323328
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Each of these commitments allows a mediator to increase the
amount and accuracy of disclosure and thus decrease the impact of
the parties' private information. Our third conclusion-that
mediators can enhance communication by adding imprecision (or
"noise") to privately disclosed information-is especially illuminat-
ing. Although adding noise would seem to degrade the quality of
information communicated, this result is only true if one mistak-
enly assumes that the amount of information disclosed is unaf-
fected by the mediator's commitments. When a mediator commits
to translate imprecisely the private disclosures of one party, the
mediator may induce that party to make more precise disclosures
to the mediator, because the mediator's imprecise translation
reduces the ability of the other side to use the disclosure to the
detriment of the disclosing party. We also show that noisy (but
correlated) signals can help mediators mitigate the inefficiencies of
moral hazard.
We reach these conclusions with a series of five game-theoretic
models of mediation that we refer to for convenience as:
1. "solicit offer" mediation;"
2. "imprecise translation" mediation;2
3. "job selection" mediation;2'
4. "battle of the sexes" mediation;22 and
5. "joint venture" mediation.'
These models are admittedly reductive and simplistic. Mediators
will never observe situations adhering precisely to the assumptions
we adopt. Most importantly, parties to a mediation rarely behave
in a purely rational way; overcoming psychological barriers to
negotiation will always be an important part of the mediator's
function. Nonetheless, our hope is that these models will demon-
strate that the mediator can overcome both psychological barriers
and economic inefficiency in negotiation. Although some law and
economics scholars have been skeptical about how mediation could
create value, these stylized models show how mediation commit-
19 See infra Part I.A.2.
20 See infra Part I.B.1.
21 See infra Part I.B.2.
22 See infra Part II.A.
23 See infra Part II.B.
1994] 329
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ments can reduce the strategic inefficiencies of adverse selection
and moral hazard.
The Article also has implications for practitioners and
lawmakers. The models suggest innovative mediation strategies
that practitioners must now weigh against alternative mechanisms.
For example, we show that mediators can increase the expected
gains from trade not only by indirectly or imprecisely disclosing the
parties' private information, but even by committing to misrepre-
sent private information a certain proportion of the time. We pro-
vide examples showing how mediators in different contexts can
productively control the flow of information between the parties by
filtering or inserting noise into their private disclosure. Contrary to
the standard claims that mediators need to keep all privately dis-
closed information confidential, we show that some form of con-
trolled disclosure is central to any economic rationale for
mediation.
Because credible commitments to particular forms of disclosure
are crucial to the effectiveness of mediators, our analysis has impli-
cations for how mediation agreements should be drafted and nego-
tiated. In particular, we propose that courts enforce mediation
agreements that allow mediators to disclose private information in
indirect ways or even break off negotiations. We also tentatively
suggest that courts should enforce, in the absence of contrary lan-
guage, an implicit provision requiring strict mediator confidential-
ity-to encourage more explicit contracting about how mediators
will use caucus information.24
Our economic analysis also suggests the proper contours for
legally mandated mediation. We argue that mediation should not
be legally mandated when the process aims at mitigating moral
hazard, but that mandatory mediation may be necessary to over-
come barriers to resolution caused by adverse selection. Legally
mandated mediation may be necessary to mitigate adverse selec-
tion because the private information that causes the adverse selec-
tion may also impede parties from voluntarily adopting the
efficient form of mediation. We show, however, that there are no
such strategic barriers to resolving moral hazard through voluntary
24 See infra Part III.B.
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mediation, which suggests that private mediation contracts should
be sufficient to respond to problems of moral hazard.
The Article has three Parts. Part I shows how mediation can
mitigate the inefficiencies of adverse selection. Part II shows how
mediation can mitigate the inefficiencies of moral hazard. And
Part III discusses the implications of our analysis for lawmakers
and practitioners.
I. MITIGATING THE INEFmcmNcIEs OF ADVERSE SELECTION
Adverse selection causes many inefficiencies in negotiations and
the resolution of disputes. Potential buyers and sellers, for exam-
ple, often have private information about how much they individu-
ally value a particular good or service.' Because each party's
reservation price26 (or BATNA) 27 is not publicly known, each party
has "hidden information" that can give rise to adverse selection.
25 While we describe negotiations between a buyer and seller, our analysis might be
applied to other dispute resolution contexts. For example, a defendant's settlement offer
can be interpreted as an offer to buy the plaintiff's claim. Notwithstanding this analogy,
distinctions between the settlement of a tort claim and the formation of a sales contract
can, in some contexts, be significant. See generally Douglas G. Baird, Robert H. Gertner
& Randal C. Picker, Game Theory and the Law 292-93 (forthcoming 1994) (noting that in
a litigation context, imperfectly informed negotiators are striving to uncover the common
expected value of litigation; in other bargaining outcomes the valuations of buyer and
seller might be more independent); Frank E.A. Sander & Jeffrey Z. Rubin, The Janus
Quality of Negotiation: Dealmaking and Dispute Settlement, 4 Negotiation J. 109 (1988)
(noting the differences between negotiation to resolve a dispute and that which is more
forward looking, focused on the formation or governance of an ongoing relationship).
Robert Gertner and Geoffrey Miller have written an excellent article that suggests how
mediative caucusing could create gains of trade in the litigation context as well. See
Robert H. Gertner & Geoffrey P. Miller, Settlement Escrows (Jan. 25, 1994) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). Gertner and Miller show
that privately reporting valuations to an "escrow agent" (who does not reveal these private
reports unless the offers constitute an enforceable contract) may create gains of trade. The
escrow agent in their model is extremely analagous to a mediator who solicits private
reports of value in our "solicit offer mediation." Their example shows that mediation can
mitigate adverse selection inefficiency even when-as in litigation-the parties have
private information about a common value and even when the mediator cannot commit to
breaking off further negotiation. In their model, as in ours, the censoring of private reports
"reduces, but does not eliminate, the adverse inferences about the strength of the offeror's
case." Id at 1.
26 The reservation price is the maximum amount that the buyer is willing to pay and the
minimum amount that the seller is willing to accept. See Raiffa, supra note 5, at 37-38.
27 BATNA (Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement) is the more qualitative term
Roger Fisher and William Ury coined to describe a concept similar to-and in some cases
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If parties had complete information about each other, bargaining
would be much less costly. First, knowing each other's reservation
price, they would immediately know whether there were gains
from trade to bargain over.2 8 Second, if the parties knew their rela-
tive bargaining power,29 they would be more likely to avoid the
inefficiencies of bargaining by quickly agreeing how to divide the
gains from trade.30
However, when the buyer and the seller have private informa-
tion about their valuations or their costs of bargaining, the parties
need to communicate-at least indirectly-something about their
private information in order to determine whether there are in fact
gains from trade.3 ' The parties' reports of information can take the
form of either direct representations concerning the buyer's or
seller's reservation price or, more commonly, the use of offers and
counteroffers to signal indirectly one's own valuation.32
The parties might strategically withhold or misrepresent the pri-
vate information, however, in order to increase their private
the same as-the quantitative "reservation price." BATNA sometimes conveys a broader
set of information than reservation price. For example, a buyer's BATNA might be the
status quo or an alternative purchase, the value of which the buyer must try to determine
in order to set the reservation price for the product at issue in the negotiation. See Roger
Fisher & William Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In 104
(Bruce Patton ed., 1981).
28 Gains from trade occur, as the name suggests, whenever an exchange would be
productive; that is, whenever the buyer values the object more than the seller.
29 In economic models of negotiation, bargaining power is often determined by the
relative costs of bargaining (e.g., each party's hourly cost of negotiating, or impatience). If
the parties' costs of bargaining are common knowledge, the first offer to divide the gains
from trade is often accepted. See Ariel Rubinstein, Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining
Model, 50 Econometrica 97 (1982).
30 The ADR literature often suggests that bargaining power can be a function of a
party's BATNA. See Fisher & Ury, supra note 27, at 106 (arguing "the better your
BATNA, the greater your power" and "the relative negotiating power of two parties
depends primarily upon how attractive to each is the option of not reaching agreement").
Although the term "BATNA" is at times used almost interchangeably with the term
"reservation price," the economics literature usually distinguishes a party's reservation
price from his or her bargaining power. For economists, the BATNAs of each side would
represent whether there were gains of trade, and the relative bargaining power of the
parties would determine how the gains are split. See Kreps, supra note 14, at 551.
31 See Cramton, supra note 17, at 579 ("Since the bargainers are uncertain about
whether trade is desirable, they must communicate some of their private information
before an agreement can be reached.").
32 Offering to sell a good at, say, $50 indirectly communicates that the seller's value is
some amount less than or equal to $50.
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returns.3 When the parties have private knowledge of their own
reservation prices, sellers will have an incentive to overstate their
valuations in order to negotiate a higher price and buyers will have
an incentive to understate their valuations in order to negotiate a
lower price.34 Strategic misrepresentations of this kind and the
contracts that result from them provide an important example of
adverse selection. Just as sick people have an incentive to convince
insurance companies that they are healthy when negotiating an
insurance premium, high-valuing buyers have an incentive to con-
vince sellers that they are low-valuing when negotiating the con-
tract price. In both cases, the asymmetric information gives the
party with private information an incentive to pretend to be a dif-
ferent type in negotiating a contract.
Adverse selection can consume a large percentage of the poten-
tial gains from trade. 6 Strategic misrepresentation of value can
induce parties to waste time bargaining when there are no gains
from trade, and to bargain to impasse at times when there are
gains. And even when agreement is reached, real resources are
33 See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L.J. 87, 94 (1989).
34 According to Cramton:
In [bargaining] games with incomplete information, players typically have an
incentive to hide their private information. Thus, the seller would like to tell the
buyer, "my valuation is high, so you better expect to pay a high price", regardless of
whether or not the seller's valuation is in fact high. The buyer, of course, is aware of
the seller's incentive to deceive and hence will not believe statements that are not
backed up by actions.
Cramton, supra note 17, at 581; see also Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Ethics of Lying in Nego-
tiations, 75 Iowa L. Rev. 1219, 1221 (1990) (arguing that "lying in negotiations is instru-
mentally effective and . . . most such lies are ethically impermissible"); James White,
Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in Negotiation, 1980 Am. B. Found.
Res. J. 926, 927 (examining the ethical aspect of lying in negotiation and noting that "[Ihe
critical difference between those who are successful negotiators and those who are not lies
in this capacity both to mislead and not to be misled").
35 See Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Economics, Organization and Management 143-
47 (1992).
36 See Fisher & Ury, supra note 27, at 6 (asserting that "positional" bargaining is
inefficient because it interferes with "reaching a settlement promptly").
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consumed in the "negotiation dance '37 that might have been
retained if the parties' valuations were public knowledge. 38
In this Part, we suggest that mediation can mitigate the ineffi-
ciencies of strategic misrepresentation in three different ways.
First, mediation can increase the costs of strategic misrepresenta-
tion by committing the parties to break off bargaining if their rep-
resentations to the mediator suggest that there are no gains from
trade. Commitments not to bargain (when there are in fact gains
from trade) are inefficient ex post but can be efficient ex ante
because of their tendency to induce more truthful revelation of
valuation.39
Second, mediation might reduce the inefficiency of strategic mis-
representation by committing the parties to divide the reported
gains from trade more or less equally. Disempowered bargainers
may be particularly reluctant to disclose their valuations if doing so
will adversely affect the terms of trade.4° Commitments to types of
mediation that foster equal division of the gains from trade can
induce weaker negotiators to be more forthcoming because they
will be assured that their disclosures will not be used against them
later when the parties settle upon the terms of trade.
Third, mediation might reduce strategic misrepresentations by
allowing a party to send noisy or censored signals about its reserva-
tion price to the other side. In particular, parties may be induced
to represent their values more truthfully to mediators if mediators
promise to disclose only whether there are gains from trade (and
not how much is on the table). If mediation can produce more
cost-effective information about whether there are gains of trade, it
can avoid costly negotiation when no such gains exist. Because
asymmetric information is an important cause of bargaining ineffi-
ciency, any feature of mediation that can move the parties toward
37 For a description of the "negotiation dance," see Raiffa, supra note 5, at 47-48.
38 The primary wasted resource is the value of each negotiating party's time in
attempting to estimate the other side's reservation price. For an anecdotal illustration of
the point, see id. at 35-38.
39 See infra text accompanying notes 67-68 for a discussion of the concepts of ex ante
and ex post efficiency.
40 See Jason S. Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract
Default Rules, 100 Yale L.J. 615, 629 (1990) (cited with approval in Ian Ayres & Robert
Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101
Yale L.. 729, 736 & n.26 (1992)).
[Vol. 80:323334
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symmetric information has the potential for increasing the
expected gains from trade.
A. Mediators Can Facilitate Commitments to Break Off
Negotiation and Equally Divide Gains From Trade
Our conclusion that mediators might want to commit the parties
to break off negotiation-even when there are potential gains from
trade-is particularly at odds with certain strains of current ADR
theory. Mediators in practice usually try to facilitate trade-even
striving to place parties in a better situation to resolve their dis-
putes independently should the mediation fail.41  And many
mediators are reluctant to let the parties walk away as long as there
might be unrealized gains from trade on the table.
The expected gains from trade can at times be increased, how-
ever, if the parties commit not to trade when their private reports
of value to the mediator are not overlapping. This Section shows
that by helping parties to break off negotiation when they have
privately indicated that there are no gains from trade, mediation
can mitigate the strategic inefficiencies of bargaining. A commit-
ment not to bargain when the seller's reported valuation is higher
than the buyer's reported valuation gives both the buyer and the
seller a greater incentive to tell the truth about their reservation
prices. Commitments to break off bargaining increase the cost of
lying-because every dollar by which a seller falsely inflates (and a
buyer deflates) her valuation increases the chance that no gains of
trade will be realized. The threat that the mediator will end further
negotiations thus creates a countervailing incentive for each party
not to misrepresent his or her type. And inducing more truthful
revelation can reduce the various costs of bargaining.42
41 See Rogers & Salem, supra note 7, at 39 (asserting that even when the mediation fails
to produce an agreement, the parties "may have learned to negotiate better and may, in
fact, settle unresolved issues themselves later"); Christopher Honeyman, Five Elements of
Mediation, 4 Negotiation J. 149, 152 (1988) (finding that, in a case study of five mediators,
"three were primarily interested . . . in getting the settlement[, while] two were more
concerned with the parties' long-term relationship").
42 Countervailing incentives of this kind make it less costly to induce truth-telling and
efficiency. See Tracy R. Lewis & David E.M. Sappington, Countervailing Incentives in
Agency Problems, 49 J. Econ. Theory 294 (1989); Tracy R. Lewis & David E.M.
Sappington, Inflexible Rules in Incentive Problems, 79 Am. Econ. Rev. 69 (1989);
Giovanni Maggi & Andrds Rodrfguez-Clare, On Countervailing Incentives (1993)
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1. A Simple Model of Bargaining With Asymmetric Information
About Reservation Price
To illustrate how mediation can mitigate the inefficiencies of
adverse selection, we begin by considering a simple (but much
studied) model of unmediated bargaining with asymmetric infor-
mation.43 In this model, a (potential) buyer has private informa-
tion about how much it values a single nondivisible good and a
(potential) seller has private information about its cost of manufac-
ture. Each side only knows that the other side's reservation price is
uniformly (and independently) distributed between $0 and $100." 4
The private information in this model inevitably leads to adverse
selection inefficiency. Even though it is efficient for trade to take
place whenever the buyer's valuation is higher than the seller's
cost, the parties' incentive to misrepresent their private informa-
tion prevents some efficient contracting from taking place. In par-
ticular, when the actual zone of agreement is small (because the
buyer's reservation price is only slightly higher than the seller's),
then the incentive to misrepresent or conceal private information
will often cause buyers to offer less than sellers.
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review Association); Eric Talley,
Contract Renegotiation and the Liquidated Damages Rule: Vindication for the Just
Compensation Principle? (1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law
Review Association).
43 For studies of this model, see Kalyan Chatterjee & William Samuelson, Bargaining
Under Incomplete Information, 31 Operations Res. 835 (1983); Peter C. Cramton,
Strategic Delay in Bargaining with IWo-Sided Uncertainty, 59 Rev. Econ. Stud. 205 (1992);
Roger B. Myerson, Analysis of Two Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information, in
Game-theoretic Models of Bargaining 115, 116-30 (Alvin E. Roth ed., 1985); Roger B.
Myerson & Mark A. Satterthwaite, Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading, 29 J. Econ.
Theory 265 (1983).
44 In this example, the seller's reservation price will equal its cost and the buyer's
reservation price will equal its valuation. The assumption that the reservation prices are
uniformly distributed means that there is an equal probability that a reservation price will
be any amount between $0 and $100. Accordingly, there is a 30% chance that the buyer
will have a valuation higher than $70. Often a disputant will believe that the probability
distribution of the other side's reservation price will have the more traditional bell shape.
Howard Raiffa, for example, describes a negotiation for a halfway house in which the
buyer estimated that there was a 50% chance that the seller's reservation price was
between $275,000 and $475,000; a 25% chance that the reservation price was between
$100,000 and $275,000; and a 25% chance that the reservation price was above $475,000.
See Raiffa, supra note 5, at 35-38.
336
HeinOnline -- 80 Va. L. Rev.  336 1994
1994] Economic Rationales for Mediation 337
The amount of adverse selection inefficiency (and the division of
the gains from trade), however, can be dramatically affected by the
particular procedural rules that govern the negotiation.45 To begin
with, consider a negotiation where the seller is assumed to make a
single take-it-or-leave-it offer to the buyer. Giving the seller the
power to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer affords the seller a great
deal of bargaining power.46 We begin by showing how mediation
can mitigate the adverse selection inefficiencies of this particular
game and then show how mediated games dominate several other
unmediated types of negotiation.
In the unmediated take-it-or-leave-it game, if the seller knows
the buyer's valuation or "type," there would be no strategic ineffi-
ciencies.47 In this stylized model, a seller who knows the buyer's
type would simply make a take-it-or-leave-it offer that was slightly
lower than the buyer's reservation price. The parties would then
always contract, because they will contract whenever there are
gains from trade (that is, whenever the buyer valued the good
more than the seller's costs of production).
By contrast, when buyers have private information, high-valuing
buyers can protect themselves from such exploitation by keeping
45 In the words of United States Representative John Dingell, "I'll let you write the
substance . . . and you let me write the procedure, and I'll screw you every time."
Regulatory Reform Act: Hearings on H.R. 2327 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative
Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 312 (1983) (statement of Rep. John D. Dingell) (quoted in Janet C. Alexander,
Unlimited Shareholder Liability Through a Procedural Lens, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 387, 387
(1992)).
46 Game theory suggests that this game allows the seller to capture virtually all of the
gains from trade if the buyer's reservation price is common knowledge. Experimental
evidence suggests, however, that college students often split the gains from trade. See, e.g.,
Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Ultimatum Game, J. Econ. Persp., Fall 1988, at 195,
196-97 (observing this phenomenon in an ultimatum game, where one party makes a take-
it-or-leave-it offer about how a fixed sum should be split between two players; if the
ultimatum is rejected, neither of the players receives any money).
In games with asymmetric information, the take-it-or-leave-it offer gives the seller a
substantial share of the gains of trade, but some buyers may earn "rents" on their private
information. See Johnston, supra note 40, at 628-29.
47 An empirical caveat to this theoretical result is again found in some college
experiments. See Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Fairness and
the Assumptions of Economics, 59 J. Bus. S285, S289-92 (1986); Thaler, supra note 46, at
196-97.
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their valuations secret.48 In this situation, the profit-maximizing
strategy for the seller (as derived in the Appendix) is to offer a
price that is the average of the seller's cost (c) of producing the
good and the maximum possible buyer value of $100. Algebrai-




Buyers whose valuation (v) is greater than p will accept this offer;
all others will reject it. The seller's price is unvaryingly inflated
above its cost and therefore is inefficient because it precludes some
socially profitable trades (even though it allows some buyers to
capture some of the gains from trade). Hence, buyers' private
knowledge causes adverse selection inefficiency.
Figure 1 depicts the symmetric information equilibrium. The
horizontal axis represents possible seller reservation prices, c; the
vertical axis represents possible buyer reservation prices, v. The
forty-five-degree symmetric information line divides the con-
tracting and noncontracting regions. In the upper left-hand comer,
the buyer's valuation exceeds the seller's cost of manufacture and
contracting and hence induces the seller to offer a price just below
the buyer's reservation price. In the lower right-hand comer, the
seller refuses to offer to sell because there are no potential gains
from trade. This figure shows the results of efficient bargaining
because the parties are able to contract whenever there are gains
from trade.
The inefficiencies of asymmetric relative to symmetric informa-
tion are shown in Figure 2. The unmediated asymmetric negotia-
tion line similarly divides the contracting and no contracting
regions, but now under the assumption that the sellers do not know
the buyers' reservation prices. This line is simply the function in
Equation 1 that relates a seller's cost to its optimal offer. When the
48 Low-valuing buyers priced out of the market might at times have an incentive to
strategically reveal their valuations to foster a lower selling price. But even if low-valuing
buyers could credibly convey their value it would do them little good because the seller
would simply charge a price only slightly lower than their revealed value.
[Vol. 80:323
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seller's cost is zero, the seller maximizes profits by offering all buy-
ers $50;49 sellers with higher costs make progressively higher offers.
The buyer's private information about its reservation price
causes an adverse selection inefficiency that significantly reduces
the contracting region in Figure 2 (in comparison with efficient
trade when there is symmetric information). Not being able to dis-
tinguish between high- and low-valuing buyers, the seller finds it
profitable to charge prices that forego many transactions where
there are potential gains from trade. This inefficiency is depicted
in Figure 2 by the horizontal difference between the symmetric and
asymmetric information lines. The seller's inability to price-dis-
criminate among different types of buyers causes the seller to
49 From Equation 1, when c = 0, p = (c + 100)/2 = (0 + 100)/2 = 50.
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exploit its market power with a single, crude high price.50 The
points of trade included under symmetric information but excluded
under asymmetric information represent foregone gains from trade
caused by adverse selection. In this example, the inefficiencies of
adverse selection sacrifice 25% of the potential gains from trade.5 '
2. An Example of Solicit Offer Mediation
In this Section, we show how mediators can mitigate this adverse
selection inefficiency. The dispute resolution technique described
is characteristically "mediative": the mediator does not adjudicate
by proposing terms of trade (as with binding and nonbinding arbi-
tration), but instead elicits private offers during sequential
caucuses with individual disputants. We examine a particular
mediation process (which we refer to as solicit offer mediation) in
which the mediator solicits from each party two private
submissions:
(1) a representation about her reservation price; and
(2) an offer to transact at the average of the reported prices,
provided that the buyer's reported valuation is higher than the
seller's.
We will refer to the buyer's and seller's reported reservation prices
as rB and rs, respectively-so that the offers would be to transact at
a price: p = (rs + rB)/ 2 provided that rB > rs. If either of the parties
refuses to make submissions of this form or if the seller's reported
reservation price is above the buyer's reported reservation price,
then the mediator prohibits any further attempts to trade.52 If the
parties do participate and if the buyer's reported value is greater
than the seller's, then the mediator reveals that the two submitted
offers constitute a legally enforceable contract under the Uniform
Commercial Code to trade at the average reported valuation.53
50 This inefficiency is of course the "deadweight loss" of standard antitrust analysis. See
F.M. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance 16-18 (2d ed. 1980).
51 The expected gains from trade are derived explicitly in Equation 12 of the Appendix.
The unmediated take-it-or-leave-it game produces expected gains from trade of $12.50,
which is 25% less than the potential gains from trade of $16.66 if there were symmetric
information.
52 We discuss later whether and how mediators might help parties break off
negotiations. See infra Part I.A.4.
53 The offers themselves are mirror images of each other, but do not specify an explicit
price. Under the Code, however, the communication of these offers with their associated
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An equilibrium exists in which the optimal strategies for solicit
offer mediation correspond to the traditional strategies of bargain-
ers: the seller has an incentive to overstate its reservation price,5 4
reservation prices would easily pass the standards for contract formation. See U.C.C. §§ 2-
204(1), (3), 2-206, 2-305 (1990).
54 The seller's optimal strategy is to report:
r. = 2c + 25
3
which in equilibrium is always greater than c. See Chatteijee & Samuelson, supra note 43.
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and the buyer has an incentive to understate its reservation price.55
Because of this incentive to misrepresent, the buyer's and seller's
reported values will only reflect a gain from trade (rB > rs, the pre-
requisite for mediated trade) when the buyer's actual value (v)
exceeds the seller's actual value (c) by at least $25:56
v>c+25. (2)
Mediation thus does not eliminate all adverse selection ineffi-
ciency. Buyers who value the good $20 more than the seller will
not buy because the buyer and seller have strategic incentives to
misrepresent their reservation prices.
This solicit offer mediation does, however, reduce the strategic
misrepresentation caused by adverse selection in two ways. First,
the mediator's ability to prohibit trade when the initial reports do
not overlap increases each party's incentive to tell the truth
because misrepresentations reduce the chance that any trade will
take place. Without the mediator's commitment to break off nego-
tiation, the parties correctly perceive that reporting biased reserva-
tion prices might lead to a more favorable contract price. When
the mediator is involved, however, each party must weigh this price
effect against the countervailing tendency of an inflated (or
deflated) reservation price to foreclose any possibility of trade.
The mediator's ability to prohibit further negotiation thus plays a
crucial role in making the buyer's and seller's representations part
of a stable equilibrium. Because either side can infer the actual
reservation price from the reported price, buyers and sellers at
times will have incentives to continue bargaining. For example, if
the buyer reports a reservation price of $60 and the seller reports a
reservation price of $70, the mediator will try to prevent further
55 The buyer's optimal strategy is to report:
2 25
rB = -v + -
which in equilibrium is always less than v. See id.




v+ 2.5>2c + 25
3
2v +25 >2c +75 =: v> c +25
[Vol. 80:323342
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bargaining. But if the mediator announces to the parties what the
reported valuations were,57 the buyer should be able to deduce that
the seller's true cost is $57.50 and the seller should be able to
deduce that the buyer's true valuation is $77.50.58 Both sides
would know that there are potential gains from trade (of $20).
After the solicit offer mediation fails, the parties accordingly may
have an incentive to continue negotiating to capture these addi-
tional gains.
However, the prospect of additional negotiation undermines the
parties' initial incentive to limit their initial misrepresentation. If,
for example, the seller knew that it would be able to continue bar-
gaining even after a failed mediation, the seller would have an
incentive to inflate its reported valuation even more severely-just
to find out (by inference) what the buyer's true reservation price is.
Knowing this, the buyer will even more severely deflate its
reported price. The possibility of continued negotiation destroys
the relationship between reported value and true value and can
induce more extreme forms of adverse selection. Thus, the media-
tor's ability to make credible commitments to break off bargaining
can prevent some inefficiency in the bargaining that does take
place.59
The mediation process also produces additional gains from trade
by limiting the seller's ability to exploit the reported information.
In the unmediated game in which the seller made a take-it-or-
leave-it offer, the high-valuing buyer would be particularly reluc-
tant to reveal its reservation price because the seller might use that
knowledge to charge a higher price. The mediator's commitment
57 The mediator's commitment not to pass on the privately reported valuations can
facilitate the parties' commitment to break off negotiations if their reported reservation
prices do not overlap. If the mediator does not indicate how close they were to making a
deal, this can chill the parties' incentive to continue bargaining. See infra text
accompanying note 85.
58 From the equations in notes 54 and 55, we can derive that:
3 3rB -25c= (r,-25)2 & v= .2 '
which implies that v = 77.5 when rB = 60 and c = 67.5 when rs = 70.
59 See also Christine M. Jolls, Contracts as Bilateral Commitments: A New Concern
About Contract Modification (Harv. L. Sch. Program in Law & Econ. Discussion Paper
No. 128, 1993) (arguing that binding commitments not to modify a contract ex post may
enhance ex ante gains from trade).
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to convey only offers that split any reported gains from trade60 pre-
vents the seller from taking advantage of this information. This
commitment reduces the buyer's reluctance to reveal its reserva-
tion price.6 1
Solicit offer mediation does not eliminate adverse selection, but
it does significantly reduce (by more than one third) the ineffi-
ciency of the unmediated bargaining. This example of solicit offer
mediation produces expected gains from trade of $14.06; the
unmediated take-it-or-leave-it offer game produces expected gains
from trade of only $12.50.62
Solicit offer mediation produces higher expected gains from
trade than not only the take-it-or-leave-it offer game, but also
many other unmediated forms of negotiation. The effectiveness of
mediation to mitigate adverse selection inefficiency in different
bargaining contexts is summarized in Table 1. When the parties are
symmetrically informed, there is no adverse selection inefficiency;
but with asymmetric information, as much as 43% of the potential
gains from trade can be consumed by strategic attempts to misrep-
resent or hide private information. Mediation does not completely
eliminate the adverse selection, but it can increase the expected
social surplus from bargaining.
60 As emphasized already, see supra text accompanying notes 52-53, the mediator is not
setting a price, because the parties agreed to, and offered each other, a formula that would
set a price splitting the gains from trade.
61 The solicit offer mediation game has been generalized to allow different divisions of
the gains from trade. See Chatterjee & Samuelson, supra note 43. When the solicited
offers require that the seller receive virtually all the reported gains from trade, the buyer's
and the seller's optimal strategies change. Under this new form of mediation, the buyer
perversely reports her actual reservation price-even though she receives none of the gains
from trade. The buyer's incentive to understate her valuation usually balances the effect
on price against the effect on the probability of trade. See Cramton, supra note 43, at 208.
Under the "seller take all" form of mediation, however, the price is fixed at the seller's
initial offer and the buyer's reported price only affects the probability of trade.
62 This result is derived explicitly in the Appendix.
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TABLE 1: RELATIVE ADVERSE SELECTION FOR DnTRETr
GAMES
Expected Social Adverse Selection
Different Bargaining Procedures Gains From Trade Inefficiency
Symmetric Information Bargaining $16.66 0%
Mediated Bargaining
"Solicit Offer" Mediation $14.06 16%
Unmediated Bargaining
Seller Take-It-Or-Leave-It Offer $12.50 25%
Seller Repeated Offers63  $11.33 32%
Alternating Buyer and Seller Offers64  $ 9.37 43%
63 This type of bargaining pressure is described in Cramton, supra note 17, at 579-81. In
the game, buyer and seller both had private information about their reservation prices.
The seller is allowed to make an infinite series of offers. If the buyer accepts any offer, the
game is over and trade takes place. And even though the bargaining could extend
indefinitely, delaying agreement reduces the potential gains from trade-so that both the
buyer and the seller have an incentive to come to an early agreement. Id. at 579. The 32%
inefficiency reported in the text, see id. at 591, represents a best case scenario-by
assuming equal bargaining power. If the bargaining power is unequally divided, the
expected gains from trade can be even smaller.
64 See Cramton, supra note 43, at 211. In this game, the bargainers again have private
information about their own reservation prices. The seller and buyer alternate making
offers and each can decide how long to wait before making a counter offer (if the previous
offer is not acceptable). Id. at 208-09. Even though the players are allowed to bargain
indefinitely, the potential gains from trade decrease over time so that both bargainers
prefer reaching an agreement quickly. Id. at 208.
As the discount rate approaches zero, the bargaining inefficiency approaches 100%-
consuming all the potential gains from trade. Peter C. Cramton, The Role of Time and
Information in Bargaining (1984) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University).
This result represents an interesting inversion of the Coase Conjecture. See Ronald H.
Coase, Durability and Monopoly, 15 J.L. & Econ. 143 (1972). Ronald Coase conjectured
that the durable good monopolists would not be able to exploit their monopoly, because
they would not be able to credibly commit not to subsequently lower their price. The
inability to commit in the extreme could mean that no one would buy above the
competitive price. See Kreps, supra note 14, at 315-16.
Game theorists found an analogue to the Coase conjecture in symmetric bargaining
games. As the time between offers becomes arbitrarily small and when the buyer and
seller have symmetric information, the seller making repeated offers cannot commit to sell
at any price above its known costs. See Fudenberg & Tirole, supra note 18, at 401-03. The
Coase conjecture in this context again suggests that as the time between periods becomes
small, the inefficiencies from bargaining can vanish.
When the parties are asymmetrically informed, however, the efficiencies may not vanish.
Indeed, because the seller wants to avoid the zero return that results after the buyers
deduce the seller's cost, the seller may be willing to bargain for increasingly long and
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These stylized results regarding solicit offer mediation represent
an important economic rationale for mediation. The mediator in
this process is able to mitigate the adverse selection inefficiencies
of asymmetric information without either mandating or suggesting
a price (as with binding and nonbinding arbitration). And what's
more, the mediator is able to create value for supremely rational
and self-interested disputants. The mediator's role is rather mini-
mal-collecting the parties, communicating reports about their
reservation prices, committing the parties to break off negotiation
when their reported reservation prices do not overlap, and inform-
ing the parties when their private offers constitute a contract-but
the mediation is nonetheless effective.
3. Resisting Efficient Mediation
Mediated bargaining produces a higher expected social surplus
than a number of different types of unmediated bargaining
games-including games where sellers have the ability to make an
unlimited number of offers or where the parties alternate making
offers.65 The superiority of solicit offer mediation to an alternating
offer negotiation is particularly important, both because alternat-
ing offer games closely resemble real world bargaining and because
alternating offer games allow different divisions of the bargaining
power.
Even though solicit offer mediation increases the expected gains
from random pairs of buyers and sellers, nonrandom pairs of buy-
ers and sellers may resist committing to this form of negotiation.
In particular, some sellers may expect to earn less under solicit
offer mediation than under the "take-it-or-leave-it" game and
accordingly will resist this form of mediation. The diverging inter-
inefficient amounts of time (to avoid revealing its type). Thus, as the discount rate
approaches zero, the seller's bargaining approaches an indefinite postponement of trade.
65 Other mediated games that include commitments not to bargain have also been
shown to increase the expected gains from trade. For example, Joseph Farrell and Robert
Gibbons have analyzed a "cheap talk" game. See Joseph Farrell & Robert Gibbons,
Cheap Talk Can Matter in Bargaining, 48 J. Econ. Theory 221 (1989). In "cheap talk"
mediation, the mediator simply solicits a dichotomous (yes/no) signal about whether the
disputants are eager to trade. The unverifiable communications to a mediator can increase
the expected values only if the mediator can break off negotiations if the parties'
subsequent offers do not overlap. See id. at 223 n.1 ("For those who miss the lawyers,
consider the commitment necessary to play even this simple game .. ").
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est of different players is shown in Figure 3. This figure compares
the contract region for the solicit offer mediation with the
unmediated, asymmetric-information negotiation (in which the
seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer).66
A comparison of the contract regions for the mediated and
unmediated games indicates why parties who know their reserva-
tion prices might resist participating in the mediation. The media-
tion game produces more trade when both the seller and buyer
have relatively low reservation prices, but the unmediated (take-it-
or-leave-it) game produces more trade when the buyer and seller
66 The symmetric information region in Figure 3 is the same as in Figure 1 and Figure 2.
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both have relatively high reservation prices. In particular, sellers
who know that their reservation prices are greater than $75 would
never want to participate in solicit offer mediation, because the
mediation would prevent these sellers from making some trades
that would occur under the unmediated procedure.
Because incentives of sellers with different reservation prices
diverge, economists evaluate the efficiency of negotiation under
three alternative assumptions about the disputants' knowledge.
The three evaluations are commonly referred to as ex ante,
interim, and ex post efficiency. Evaluations of ex ante efficiency
assume that the bargainers do not yet know either party's reserva-
tion price; evaluations of interim efficiency assume that each bar-
gainer knows her own reservation price (but not the other
player's); and evaluations of ex post efficiency assume that both
players' reservation prices are common knowledge. 67 Because par-
ties have different types of knowledge in different dispute contexts,
a particular standard to evaluate negotiation efficiency will only be
appropriate if the disputants have the assumed type of knowledge.
Although the ex post efficient result is for trade to occur when-
ever the buyer's reservation price exceeds the seller's, we have
shown that the presence of private information precludes this out-
come. Thus, even if the buyer's and seller's valuations become
known after a negotiation (ex post), the interim asymmetry of
information creates a strategic barrier to efficient trade-even in a
world with costless contracts. The criterion of interim efficiency
takes this asymmetric information into account by analyzing what
is efficient, given that the negotiators will try to earn rents on their
private information.68
A major problem for policymakers is that many different types
of negotiation are interim efficient in the Pareto sense.69 That is,
changing from one bargaining procedure to another often
decreases the returns of some of the players. Figure 3 illustrates
67 Peter C. Cramton, Sequential Bargaining Mechanisms, in Game-theoretic Models of
Bargaining, supra note 43, at 149, 163.
68 Just as lessors try to earn rents on real property, individuals who possess other kinds
of property-including possession of valuable information-will often try to earn an
economic rent as a condition of trade. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 40, at 750.
69 Pareto efficiency requires that no other allocation can improve the payoffs of some
players without reducing the payoffs of others. See Kreps, supra note 14, at 153.
[Vol. 80:323348
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how more than one type of negotiation procedure can be interim
efficient. Even though solicit offer mediation increases the
expected ex ante gains from trade (for players who don't yet know
their valuations) over unmediated take-it-or-leave-it negotiation,
the mediation reduces the expected gains for some buyers and sell-
ers who know their reservation prices. Thus, from an interim per-
spective, neither solicit offer mediation nor the unmediated take-it-
or-leave-it negotiation dominates the other.7 °
Evaluating alternative negotiation mechanisms from the ex ante
perspective (before the parties know their valuations), in contrast,
we have shown that the solicit offer mediation dominates the
unmediated take-it-or-leave-it game. Because the total expected
gains from solicit offer mediation are greater, it is in the seller's
and buyer's mutual interest to commit to this mediation-if they
have the opportunity to commit before learning their individual
values.71 There is an economic analogy here to John Rawis' A The-
ory of Justice,72 because "behind the veil of ignorance" it is easier
for the players to voluntarily agree to the negotiation procedure
that will maximize the gains from trade. Indeed, Roger Myerson
70 Each of these bargaining procedures reduces the expected returns for identifiable
players.
71 As shown in the Appendix, the expected ex ante payoff from the solicit offer
mediation is $7.03 each for the buyer and seller. The expected ex ante payoff from the
seller take-it-or-leave-it game is $4.16 for the buyer and $8.34 for the seller. Because the
expected gains from trade are higher in the mediated game ($14.06 = $7.03 + 7.03 > $12.50
= $4.16 + 8.34), the buyer should be willing to pay the seller between $1.31 and $2.86 to
agree to mediation.
Indeed, if the parties were able to commit to any negotiation strategy before knowing
their type, they could achieve ex post efficiency by contracting with a third party to provide
"negotiation insurance." For example, each party might pay one-twelfth of $100 ($8.33) to
a negotiation insurer who promises to pay the buyer [(rB)2/4] and promises to pay the seller
[(100- rs)2/4] whether or not trade takes place. It can be shown that this form of insurance
mitigates the buyer's incentive to understate its value and the seller's incentive to overstate
its costs, and thus induces both the buyer and the seller to offer their true reservation
prices in the solicit offer mediation game. With this insurance, trade takes place whenever
the buyer's reservation price is higher than the seller's (ex post efficiency). The third-party
bargaining insurer expects to break even because the expected payout of the insurance
equals the total premium received ($16.66). This result is only possible, however, if a
competitive insurance market exists. Besides traditional impediments to competitions,
third-party insurers may worry that the bargainers will collude to inflate the size of the
payoffs. Because of these problems in offering efficient insurance, bargainers behind the
veil of ignorance may not be able to do better than solicit offer mediation. It yields the
highest ex ante payoff without involving a third-party insurer.
72 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971).
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and Mark Satterthwaite have proven that the solicit offer media-
tion produces the highest expected ex ante surplus of any possible
interim efficient game.73
However, because the parties often do not have an opportunity
to commit to a specific type of negotiation (bargain over the bar-
gaining procedure) 74 until after they have learned their types, the
privately informed parties will often resist mediation procedures
that would increase the expected gains from trade: "the players
know their private information before they begin negotiations, and
therefore would be unable to agree on an ex ante-efficient mecha-
nism, because the players are concerned with their interim utilities
... rather than their ex ante utilities."75 The reluctance of some
negotiators to voluntarily agree to participate in value-enhancing
mediations provides a powerful rationale for considering legally
73 See Myerson & Satterthwaite, supra note 43. They were able to show that the
equilibrium in the solicit offer mediation game is the same as the equilibrium produced by
a mediation process in which the mediator again solicits reservation prices and offers, but
the offers to trade must now be at a new price (p'):
rB + rs+50p = 3 ifrB>rS+ 25
Id. at 277. The authors showed that this mediation process gives the buyer and seller the
incentive to truthfully report their reservation prices (so that rB = v and rs = c). Intuitively,
the mediator's refusal to allow trade unless the reported reservations are more than $25
apart accomplishes the exaggeration that the private parties would have done for them-
selves in the original solicit offer mediation.
This revised mediation process is an example of the "revelation principle," which shows
that for every game in which parties make reports about their private information, there
exists a game that produces the same equilibrium payoffs for the players but in which the
players choose to speak truthfully. See Kreps, supra note 14, at 700-03. Economists refer
to these games in which truth-telling is optimal as "direct mechanisms." Because every
game (in which parties have to make reports about private information) has an equivalent
direct mechanism, theorists searching for optimal forms of mediation can restrict their
attention to the class of direct mechanisms. Myerson and Satterthwaite's seminal article
was able to prove that the foregoing direct mechanism, which is equivalent to solicit offer
mediation, produced greater gains from trade than any other game that satisfies the con-
straints for interim efficiency. See Myerson & Satterthwaite, supra note 43, at 274-78.
This mechanism design approach is a powerful new tool for analyzing optimal legal rules
in strategic contexts. It is just now beginning to be used by law and economics scholars.
See Jason S. Johnston, Bargaining and Form (1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the Virginia Law Review Association); Talley, supra note 42.
74 See Fisher & Ury, supra note 27, at 89-91 (presenting examples which illustrate that
even when parties cannot agree about substance, they can agree to a particular procedure
to resolve their dispute).
75 Cramton, supra note 67, at 167.
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mandated mediation. As discussed more fully below,76 the same
private information that creates adverse selection inefficiencies can
also create barriers to voluntary adoption of efficient forms of
mediation. Mandating mediation to respond to the problems of
adverse selection could, at least at the theoretical level, increase
the gains from trade.
4. Methods for Making Credible Commitments to Break Off
Negotiations
The effectiveness of solicit offer mediation turned particularly on
the ability of the mediators to end negotiations if the buyer's stated
valuation revealed in the sequential caucusing was not higher than
the seller's valuation. But we have not addressed how mediators
could credibly break off negotiations where (the parties' misrepre-
sentations notwithstanding) there may in fact be an economic
incentive to trade. This Section analyzes the commitment problem
and suggests particular methods that would help the mediator to
end negotiations.
One of the biggest obstacles to implementing this form of media-
tion may come from mediators themselves. Often, mediators and
those who train them focus too much on ex post efficiencies. A
mediation is defined as a success if it brings the parties closer to
agreement, or creates a more conciliatory atmosphere in which the
parties might be able to conduct further negotiations on their
own.77 Thus, it runs strongly counter to mediators' instincts to end
negotiations, especially when the buyer may ultimately have a
higher value than the seller. The current practice tends to ignore
how continued bargaining can distort the initial incentives to tell
the truth. As in other legal contexts, the focus on ex post outcomes
undermines the ability to enhance ex ante returns.78
76 See infra text accompanying notes 158-59.
77 See sources cited supra note 41; see also Peter A. Veglahn, Education by Third Party
Neutrals: Functions, Methods, and Extent, 28 Lab. L. 20, 20-21 (1977) ("Mediation and
other forms of intervention, beyond attempting to help the parties resolve their
differences, seek to increase the maturity of the collective bargaining relationship," and
"[t]he mediator, by using a variety of tactics, can help the parties develop habits of
agreement.").
78 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98
Harv. L. Rev. 4, 19-21 (1984) (discussing the extent to which Supreme Court jurisprudence
takes into account how rules affect future behavior).
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Mediators, however, occasionally do impose time limits on nego-
tiations. For example, a mediator might demand that after a cer-
tain time on a certain date, the mediation will terminate no matter
what the parties want at that time. The mediator might make this
announcement realizing that she runs the risk of terminating a
potentially productive negotiation between parties on the verge of
agreement. In individual cases, the mediator realizes, this strategy
could be inefficient-preventing resolution of a case through nego-
tiation. In the long run, however, if the mediator's threat to termi-
nate is credible, the parties may be induced to seriously negotiate
earlier in the process and save substantial time and money.79
The occasional practice of placing time limits (drop-dead dates
and the like) on negotiation provides some proof that negotiators
have some power to prevent disputants from continuing negotia-
79 Indeed, in a training videotape produced by the American Arbitration Association,
the mediator does just this. He gives the parties a strict deadline for the termination of the
mediation. A Mediation of a Construction Dispute (A.A.A. 1989) (on file with authors).
The distinction between ex post and ex ante analysis also informs an ADR practitioner's
use of final offer arbitration. In final offer arbitration, each party submits a settlement
figure to the arbitrator, who must choose one or the other. The arbitrator cannot "split the
baby" or depart in any way from the two offered amounts. Knowing that the arbitrator
will choose either its figure or the opponent's, each party is thought to be motivated to
propose a more reasonable figure. As the offers become more reasonable, the probability
of settlement increases. Ideally, the arbitration portion of the process can be obviated
altogether if the parties settle. See Stephen B. Goldberg, Frank E.A. Sander & Nancy H.
Rogers, Dispute Resolution: Negotiation, Mediation, and Other Processes 223-25 (1992);
Thomas A. Kochan & Harry C. Katz, Collective Bargaining and Industrial Relations 278-
89 (1988); John Kennan & Robert Wilson, Bargaining With Private Information, 31 J.
Econ. Literature 45, 88 (1993). Just as the "penalty" of having the arbitrator choose the
opponent's offer drives a party to make more reasonable offers in final offer arbitration, so
too the "penalty" of walking away from a profitable deal could motivate a party to give the
mediator a more accurate report about its reservation price.
Stephen Goldberg, Frank Sander, and Nancy Rogers also employ some ex ante analysis
in their discussion of "med-arb" (the ADR process in which the mediator becomes a
binding arbitrator of a dispute, if the mediation fails to produce agreement). They note
that arbitration following a failed mediation can chill the parties' disclosures to the neutral
in the mediation phase of the process, because the parties fear that information they
disclose might be used against them if the dispute reaches the arbitration phase. The threat
of arbitration thus may lead parties to produce less information in mediation, and because
the med-arb neutral has less information at her disposal, she may be less likely to reach
settlements than a "pure" mediator. See Goldberg, Sander & Rogers, supra, at 226-27; see
also Lon L. Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, in Collective Bargaining and
the Arbitrator's Role: Proceedings of the Fifteenth Annual Meeting, National Academy of
Arbitrators 8, 26-33 (BNA 1962) (discussing related issues and problems of having the
same person perform both the role of mediatior and arbitrator in a dispute).
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tions. The current efforts of mediators to break off negotiation,
however, are normally triggered by the passage of time, whereas
our model of solicit offer mediation suggests that pessimistic cau-
cus disclosures might be sufficient to trigger interruption. The par-
ties may be willing to accept a mediator's time limitation and
discontinue negotiations because the passage of time itself may be
independently sufficient to convince the parties that there are no
potential gains from trade. Revelation-based interruptions (as
mandated by the solicit offer mediation), on the other hand, may
be harder to enforce-especially when parties have a strong inkling
that gains from trade exist. Giving mediators the ability to force
parties to walk away from a few value-creating transactions can
facilitate the creation of value more generally. But mediators may
need to take additional steps to force parties away from a table
that is not empty.
With this introduction, let us briefly discuss four ways that a
mediator might enforce the commitment to break off negotiations:
by contracting; by taking a hostage; by concealing caucus informa-
tion; and by fomenting enmity.
a. Contract
The most straightforward commitment device might be a con-
tract. The two disputants might simply commit contractually to ter-
minate negotiations if directed to do so by their mediator. Adverse
selection, however, may again prevent the parties from entering
into such an agreement once they know their valuations.8 0 More-
over, even if the parties had committed to this type of mediation
contract ex ante, it may be difficult to prevent them from modify-
ing their contractual commitment ex post-especially if they can
infer that trade is mutually advantageous.s1 Under traditional con-
tract law, the mediator would not have standing to contest such a
modification unless the mediator were explicitly made a third-party
beneficiary.s2 And although it might be in the parties' (ex ante)
80 See supra Part I.A.3.
81 For example, a buyer may have misrepresented her reservation price but know (with
certainty) that there are gains from trade, because her actual valuation is higher than the
seller's reported value (which if anything was overstated).
82 See Edward J. Murphy & Richard E. Speidel, Studies in Contract Law 1335 (4th ed.
1991). Even if the mediator does have standing to sue and the ability to deter continued
1994] 353
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interest to give the mediator such standing, common law courts
might have difficulty finding the mediator to have a cognizable
interest in the termination of negotiations.
b. Taking a Hostage
These contractual limitations might be overcome, however, if the
mediation contract is structured to give the mediator some kind of
economic "hostage. 's3 The hostage could be a bond posted by the
parties which would be forfeited if they continued to negotiate.
Alternatively, the mediator might require that at least one of the
parties disclose a trade secret which the mediator could reveal if
the parties negotiated after the mediator called for a termination . 4
c. Concealing Caucus Information
The mediator might also facilitate the parties' commitment not
to bargain further by refusing to disclose information about the
parties' reported values, especially when those values are close.
Disclosing the privately reported reservation prices can undermine
the mediator's injunction to break off negotiations. Each party
knows its true value, and if the reported values are close the parties
may be able to determine or infer that there are gains from trade.85
negotiations, the parties might have a joint incentive to bribe the mediator to waive her
contractual entitlement to block further negotiation.
83 An economic hostage is an asset that is forfeited if the granting party fails to abide by
the terms of an implicit or explicit agreement. See Oliver E. Williamson, Credible
Commitments: Using Hostages To Support Exchange, 73 Am. Econ. Rev. 519,519 (1983).
84 Note that holding a trade secret from either party will give the mediator leverage to
prevent further negotiation, because the party who owns the trade secret will have
incentives to refuse to negotiate further with the other side.
The trade secret approach might be superior to the requirement that the parties post a
bond, because the mediator could hold the information indefinitely-insuring continued
enforcement of the commitment-without impeding the party's use of the information. If
a trade secret was not available for use as a hostage, the parties might post a bond in the
form of a letter of credit, which would reduce the parties' opportunity cost of indefinitely
posting capital with the mediator.
Another problem with the bond, however, is that it would create incentives for the
mediator to claim that the bond is forfeit because the parties were negotiating. The trade
secret information, on the other hand, would be more valuable to the party who owns it
than to the mediator. Thus the mediator could use it as leverage but would have little
incentive to falsely accuse the parties of negotiating further.
85 See supra text accompanying notes 57-58 (giving an example of parties inferring true
gains of trade from reported value); supra note 81 (explaining more direct deduction).
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If, however, the mediator refuses to disclose the reported reserva-
tion prices and tells them simply that they do not overlap, the
mediator can reduce the parties' incentive to continue bargaining.
Not knowing how close they are to agreement, the parties will be
less likely to expend resources when there may ultimately be no
zone of agreement. Concealing the caucus information may be one
of the simplest methods of facilitating solicit offer mediation.
d. Fomenting Enmity
Finally, mediators may adopt a truly "perverse" strategy, one
that shows how economic rationales for mediation may contradict
the psychological rationales that dominate current practice. s6 To
reinforce the mediator's position as a necessary intermediary to
any negotiation, the mediator might actively foment (rather than
diffuse) enmity between the parties to the negotiation. If the par-
ties are hostile toward each other, it is less likely that they will be
able to directly negotiate without the mediator's assistance. This
strategy can make more credible the mediator's threat that negoti-
ations will cease if the parties' reported reservation prices do not
overlap. This of course runs directly counter to the belief that one
of the mediator's chief purposes is to diffuse hostility between par-
ties and effect a general improvement in their relations.8 7 This
strategy would be ill advised if the negotiation did not involve an
extremely discrete transaction, because rancor could interfere with
any type of relational performance.88
86 By suggesting that mediators can induce passion among the parties, we are
momentarily suspending our assumption that the parties to the mediation are rational
actors.
87 See Lon L. Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. Cal. L. Rev. 305, 325
(1971) (describing the central quality of mediation as "its capacity to reorient the parties
toward each other, not by imposing rules on them, but by helping them to achieve a new
and shared perception of their relationship, a perception that will redirect their attitudes
and dispositions toward one another"); accord Doyle & Haydock, supra note 5, at 74
(stating that effective mediators can "diffuse hostilities and deal with emotions between
the parties"); Singer, supra note 5, at 20 (stating that a mediator may work by "soothing
ruffled feelings"); Center for Dispute Settlement, Mediation Training Manual 10 (1988)
(asserting that mediation "decreases the hostility that might result from litigation").
8 For a discussion of relational contracting see Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott,
Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 Va. L. Rev. 1089 (1981); Alan Schwartz, Relational
Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreement and Judicial Strategies, 21
J. Legal Stud. 271 (1992).
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B. Mediators Can Mitigate Adverse Selection By Sending Noisy
Translations
In the last Section we explored how solicit offer mediation ena-
bled a mediator to use substantive commitments (conveying only
offers that equally divided reported gains) and procedural commit-
ments (breaking off negotiations) to induce more accurate disclo-
sure of the parties' private valuations and thus mitigate adverse
selection inefficiency. In this Section, we explore an additional,
value-creating commitment even more directly tied to accurate dis-
closure: a mediator's commitment to collect information in sequen-
tial caucuses and send noisy translations of it to the other side.
The focus on noisy translation is at odds with much of the rheto-
ric of mediation practitioners but at the same time more faithful to
actual practice, in which mediators inevitably make indirect and
imprecise disclosures of caucus information.8 9 The ADR literature
talks of the need not only to preserve the confidentiality of private
communications, but also to offer more precise translations of the
parties' public statements by filtering out needlessly provocative or
confusing messages. 90 We show, however, that it may be in both
parties' interest for the mediator to commit to imprecise or noisy
disclosure of information obtained during sequential caucuses.
The success of this strategy also turns on the ability of the mediator to create a particular
type of rancor. In the negotiation context, it is important to distinguish between
"associational" and "consequential" animus. Associational animus causes parties to dislike
associating with each other. Consequential animus is a form of interdependent utility,
whereby one party receives extra pleasure when another party is disfavored. Associational
animus might help reinforce the commitment to negotiate exclusively through a mediator,
but consequential animus can create significant barriers to dispute resolution, as each side
might hold out for a larger share of the pie in order to disadvantage the other side. See Ian
Ayres & Peter Siegelman, Race and Gender Discrimination in Bargaining For a New Car
(1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review Association)
(discussing consequential and associational animus and estimating whether new car dealers
are motivated by either).
89 As discussed, if a mediator assiduously refuses to make any indirect disclosures of
information gleaned during sequential caucuses (by constructing an informational
"Chinese wall"), see supra text accompanying notes 7-10, then the mediator ceases to
perform a core mediative function.
90 See Doyle & Haydock, supra note 5, at 74 (stating that the mediator serves as
"diplomat, translator, interpreter"); Singer, supra note 5, at 20 (maintaining that the
mediator can "get negotiations back on track... [by] communicating selected information
back and forth, often translating it from negative to positive language").
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Our provocative conclusion is that commitments to add impreci-
sion to the privately disclosed information can improve the quality
and increase the quantity of the information ultimately communi-
cated. Even though it seems that adding noise would decrease the
amount of information communicated, this result is only true if one
mistakenly assumes that the amount and quality of the information
disclosed to the mediator remains constant. Commitments by a
mediator to imprecisely translate the private disclosures of one
party can induce that party to make more precise disclosures to the
mediator.91
As with the commitment to pass on only offers that equally
divide reported gains, the commitment to noisy translation can
reduce the ability of the stronger bargainer to exploit the newly
disclosed information. For example, a seller with take-it-or-leave-it
market power will respond to precise information about the
buyer's valuation by extracting all the gains from trade, but cannot
so effectively exploit a less precise report of the buyer's valuation.
Without the mediator's precommitment to add noise, the privately
informed parties may find it in their self-interest to disclose less
information. We show that without the commitment to make
imprecise translations, the disputant with private information may
refuse to make any disclosure to the other side.
The mediated equilibrium with imprecise information can easily
dominate an unmediated equilibrium with no disclosure. For exam-
ple, inducing more information about each side's reservation price
can reduce the expense of "wasted" bargaining when there are in
fact no gains from trade.92 We show the effectiveness of noisy
translation both when the mediator omits information and when
91 Ibis ability of noisy translation to enhance disclosure is also suggested by
"randomized response" survey technique. See Jennifer G. Brown, Competitive Federalism
and the Legislative Incentive to Recognize Same-Sex Marriage (1994) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). If researchers are
concerned that survey respondents may be reluctant to answer certain types of sensitive
question truthfully, they may ask respondents to follow a randomized response procedure:
Respondants (who, for example might be asked if they are gay) would be instructed to
privately flip a coin and to respond "yes" if the coin comes up heads and to respond
truthfully only if the coin comes up tails. The randomization allows any individual
respondent to hide whether she is gay but allows researchs to infer what proportion of the
population is gay.
92 The expectation of enhanced information about the other side's reservation price
might also reduce the incentive of each side to expend resources trying to investigate and
1994]
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the mediator inserts inaccuracy. A precise disclosure to a media-
tor, for example, regarding one party's reservation price ("My res-
ervation price is $40") could be made less precise if the mediator
either makes a less precise true statement ("Her reservation price
is some amount less than $50") or commits to making precise but
probabilistically untrue statements ("I represent that her reserva-
tion price is $20, but remember that under my mediation contract I
misrepresent her value 25% of the time"). We show how both
types of noisy translations can induce better disclosure in two dif-
ferent contexts: reservation price information and information
about an applicant's job preferences.
1. Noise by Omission: An Example of "Imprecise, But True"
Translation Concerning Reservation Price
In the solicit offer mediation, we suggested that the mediator
should avoid revealing the amount by which reported values might
fail to overlap in order to reinforce the parties' commitment to
break off negotiations. 93 Even when there is no commitment to
break off bargaining, however, a mediator may enhance the gains
from trade by revealing only whether there are reported gains from
trade-not the size of these reported gains. By sending the parties
an imprecise signal about the size of the gains from trade, the
mediator can balance the parties' individual interest in concealing
their valuations and their joint interests in avoiding costly negotia-
tions when there is no zone of agreement.
To capture this intuition, we modify the unmediated take-it-or-
leave-it negotiation by including a bargaining cost of $4 each time a
seller makes an offer to a potential buyer. As shown in the Appen-
dix, this transaction cost does not affect the profit-maximizing price
of those sellers who make offers, but dramatically affects the
number of sellers willing to make any offers.
The seller's inability to distinguish between high- and low-valu-
ing buyers forces a seller to incur the cost of many "wasted" offers.
High-cost sellers calculate that the probability of buyer acceptance
is too low to justify spending $4 to make an offer. The magnitude
estimate this figure. See Raiffa, supra note 5, at 37 (discussing negotiation in which such
estimates were made).
93 See supra Part I.A.4.c.
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of this resulting inefficiency is fairly dramatic, as 40% of the sellers
(those with costs greater than $60) find it unprofitable to make any
offers.94
This additional inefficiency of asymmetric information is
depicted in Figure 4. As before,95 the asymmetric information line
is taken from Equation 1 and divides the contracting and no con-
tracting regions when the seller does not know the buyer's reserva-
tion price-as long as the seller's cost does not exceed $60. Where
the sellers cost is greater than $60, the seller will not make an offer
and a large area thus becomes a no-contracting region.
The buyer's private information about its reservation price now
causes an additional form of adverse selection inefficiency. As
before, the profit-maximizing seller chooses to use its imperfectly
informed market power by charging a single supracompetitive
price that excludes many buyers even when there are potential
gains from trade. This inefficiency is depicted in Figure 4 by the
horizontal difference between the symmetric and asymmetric infor-
mation lines.
Moreover, with the $4 transaction cost, the sellers' incomplete
information chills the willingness of many sellers even to bear the
relatively small costs of making offers. It is understandable that
sellers whose production costs (c) are greater than $96 will refuse
to make offers when the g. = 4 (because the total costs of transact-
ing are greater than any seller will be able to collect from a buyer).
This result is depicted in Figure 4 by the symmetric information
line intersecting the top of the Figure at c = $96.96 Yet when the
seller has incomplete information, the inefficiencies caused by a $4
cost of making offers are much more extreme. Sellers with produc-
tion costs greater than $60 will decline to make any offers, rather
than bear the cost of making $4 offers when many buyers will
94 As shown in the Appendix, if the cost of bargaining (gi) is $4 per offer, sellers will not
make offers when:
c> 100 - 20'F9
which simplifies to c > 60 when g = 4.
95 See supra Figure 2.
96 The symmetric information line in Figure 4 is the same as in Figure 2 except that it is
shifted up $4. Because the seller must pay $4 per offer, trade will only take place when the
buyer's value is higher than the seller's total cost (including the offering cost). Given this
transaction cost, the symmetrically informed equilibrium, which contains no adverse
selection inefficiency, still represents the first-best benchmark.
1994]
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refuse to trade.97 With symmetric information, a $4 offering cost
deters 4% of sellers from making any offers; but with asymmetric
information the same $4 cost deters 40% of the sellers from partici-
97 A seller whose cost of production is $60 maximizes profit by offering to sell at $80.
But at this price, the seller can only expect to sell to 20% of the buyers (those having a
reservation price between $80 and $100). Accordingly, sellers can expect a $20 profit 20%
of the time. But this ignores the seller's $4 cost of making an offer. Because the seller does
not know the buyer's reservation price, if the seller chooses to make an offer it runs the
substantial risk that the buyer will reject the offer. When the offer is $80 there is an 80%
chance of rejection. Hence, when the seller's cost is $60, the expected profit net of
contracting cost is $20(.2) - $4 = 0. Sellers with manufacturing cost greater than $60 find
that it is unprofitable to make offers to any buyer.
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pating in the market. Moreover, even for those sellers who choose
to make offers, a large proportion of the gains from trade are con-
sumed by "wasted" offers that go unaccepted. 98 This inefficiency is
depicted in Figure 4 by the vertical portion of the asymmetric infor-
mation line.
Mediators can mitigate this "wasted offer" inefficiency by send-
ing noisy translations of privately disclosed reports to the other
party. Consider a process in which the mediator asks each buyer
for his or her precise reservation price, but only tells the seller
whether that reported reservation price is greater or less than
$50.99 If the buyer's reported offer is greater than $50, the media-
tor allows the seller to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer.1°° The com-
mitment to send imprecise, but true translations induces the buyers
to reveal more information and allows the sellers to more coher-
ently target the costly offers.
As described in the Appendix, this rather minimalist mediation
process can produce an equilibrium in which buyers truthfully
report their precise reservation price: Truth-telling is an optimal
strategy for both high-valuing buyers (because it preserves an
opportunity to trade) and low-valuing buyers (because take-it-or-
leave-it sellers would never offer a price below $50 in any case). 10'
If the mediator tells the seller that the buyer's reported reservation
98 As can be derived from Equation 12 in the Appendix, this additional transaction cost
reduces the expected social surplus of the unmediated take-it-or-leave-it offer game from
$12.50 to $11.70 for randomly selected buyers and sellers.
99 This form of mediation is analogous to the mechanism analyzed by Farrell & Gibbons,
supra note 65.
100 This mediation, like the solicit offer mediation, empowers the mediator to terminate
negotiations, but with an even cruder trigger. Because the mediator is only soliciting
reports of valuation from the buyer, this mediation process is even more likely to terminate
negotiations when there are gains from trade. The mediation process is also simpler than
solicit offer mediation because the mediator does not solicit binding offers from the
parties.
For this stylized example, we assume that the mediation is costless. While this unrealistic
assumption certainly biases our model toward finding an efficiency, it allows us to highlight
how mediation can mitigate the "wasted offer" inefficiency. In the real world, mediators
would need to balance the "wasted offer" cost against the mediation costs themselves.
101 As emphasized in the Appendix, this game has other equilibria that produce lower
gains from trade. Mediators may be able to play powerful roles in influencing which
equilibrium evolves. Law and economic analysis often looks to other disciplines for
assistance in this inquiry. See Ian Ayres, Playing Games with the Law, 42 Stan. L. Rev.
1291, 1310-15 (1990) (book review).
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price is above $50, the seller's profit maximizing strategy in this
mediated game is still to use the same pricing formula as in the
unmediated game (Equation 1) in offering to sell at a price (PM)
equal to:
c+100 (3)PM - 232
The mediation process, however, induces more sellers to make
offers. In the unmediated game, sellers with reservation prices
above $60 refused to make offers, but as shown in Figure 5, media-
tion increases the contracting region by inducing sellers with reser-
vation prices up to approximately $72 to make offers. 02
The intuition behind this change is straightforward. In the
unmediated game, buyers are reluctant to disclose their precise res-
ervation price to a seller who can make individualized take-it-or-
leave-it offers. Even low-valuing buyers lack an incentive to come
forward and reveal their types, because doing so still allows the
seller to respond by extracting virtually all of the gains from
trade.1 "3 Because of the buyers' hidden information, sellers who
decide to make offers have to make them to an undifferentiated
mass of high- and low-valuing buyers. The seller bears a cost of $4
per offer, but knows that at least half of these offers would be
rejected.1°4 In the unmediated negotiation, the seller's profits are
thus dramatically reduced by the substantial probability that any
offer would be made to a low-valuing buyer.
The mediator's commitment to a noisy translation can induce the
buyers to reveal more information than is produced when sellers
make unmediated take-it-or-leave-it offers. Mediation communi-
cates to the sellers which buyers have reservation prices above $50
102 As shown in the Appendix, in the mediated game sellers will make offers when:
c < 100 - 42 0 0g,
which simplifies approximately to c < 71.7, when p. = 4.
103 Thus, if buyers incurred a small fixed cost of coming forward and credibly
establishing their low value, they would strictly prefer to conceal their information.
104 In the unmediated game, the probability that a seller's offer would be rejected would
simply equal the seller's price (p) divided by 100. As noted in Equation 1, the seller's
optimal pricing strategy in the unmediated game is (c+100)/2. Thus a seller whose
production cost is $40 would optimally charge $70 ((100 + 40)/2) and realize that 70% of
the buyers would reject this offer.
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and thus identifies an enriched pool of potential buyers. Reducing
the probability of wasted offers induces more sellers (with higher
cost) to make offers. Moreover, expected profits are greater even
for those sellers who made offers in the original game, because all
sellers reduce the probability of wasted offers. 10 5
105 This extremely stylized form of mediation is Pareto superior to the unmediated
games because none of the buyer types are worse off and some are made better off by the
mediation process. As shown in Figure 5: (1) buyers with reservation prices below $50
never contract in either game; (2) buyers with payoffs between $50 and $80 have the same
opportunity to contract in either game (buyers in this range would never be able to take
advantage of the additional offers made by the higher cost sellers, because these offers
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2. Noise by Commission: An Example of "Precise, But
Probabilistically False" Translation Concerning Job
Selection
In the foregoing examples, private information about reservation
prices induced inefficiencies due to adverse selection. High-valu-
ing buyers act as if they have low values, low-valuing sellers act as
if they have high costs. But adverse selection can also occur when
buyers or sellers have private information about other aspects of
the deal.
In this Section, we consider a type of adverse selection caused by
an employee's private information about her innate abilities and
preferences (or "type"). Mediators are able to mitigate the ineffi-
ciencies of adverse selection by caucusing with the employee pri-
vately and then transmitting a noisy signal about the employee's
type to the employer. In the previous example, the mediator con-
veyed a true, but imprecise translation of the buyer's reservation
price. In this job selection game, we show how mediators might
also commit to imprecise translation by conveying precise but
probabilistically false statements about the employee's type.
Because the listener (the employer in this example) knows that the
precise statement is false a certain percentage of time, the impreci-
sion restrains her from exploiting the information. As before, the
commitment to imprecise translation induces more disclosure and
thus mitigates adverse selection.
This type of noisy transmission of information from one party to
another captures an important feature of sequential caucusing.
Value creation through mediation turns crucially on the way the
mediator translates private reports. Imprecision is a necessary ele-
ment. If the mediator precisely restates what was revealed during
a caucus, the mediator accomplishes nothing that could not be
would be greater than $80); and (3) buyers with reservation prices above $80 are strictly
better off with mediation because they have additional opportunities to contract profitably.
The simple mediation process of this model provides a mechanism by which sellers can
reduce the costs of making offers when there are no gains from trade, as it screens out low-
valuing buyers. Not only does this mechanism increase the payoffs for the active sellers in
the unmediated game, but it permits new types of sellers to enter the market, which in turn
increases the payoffs of both buyers and sellers with higher reservation prices. Sellers with
reservation prices between $60 and $71 and buyers with reservation prices above $80
increase their expected payoffs. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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accomplished by unmediated communication between the parties.
And as we stressed in the Introduction, mediators who erect a
"Chinese wall" and commit not to reveal private information-
directly or indirectly-cannot add value as mediators.
Consider the following job selection game.1 6 An employer must
decide whether to hire a job applicant and, if so, whether to give
her one of four possible jobs. Job applicants are either "geeks" or
"poets"-that is, either mathematically or verbally inclined. The
payoffs for the game are summarized in Table 2:
TABLE 2: JOB SELECTION GAME PAYOFFs
Job I Job 2 No Job Job 3 Job 4
Poet 6,10 10,9 0,7 4,4 3,0
Geek 3,0 4,4 0,7 10,9 6,10
[The first number in each box represents the payoff to the appli-
cant and the second number represents the payoff to the employer,
for that particular job and employee type.]
A poet produces higher profits for the employer in job 1, because
that job most fully exploits the poet's verbal skills; but a poet pre-
fers job 2 because it is more varied (and therefore more interest-
ing). Jobs 3 and 4 require increasing levels of mathematical
sophistication for which a poet is poorly suited-especially job 4
which requires technical specialization.10 7 A geek's preferences are
106 This game was developed in Francoise Forges, Equilibria With Communication in a
Job Market Example, 105 QJ. Econ. 375, 378-79 (1990). See generally Kennan & Wilson,
supra note 79 (describing other game-theoretic bargaining models).
107 Forges provides two alternative characterizations for these payoffs:
[L]et the candidates be engineers with either technical skills or managerial,
leadership skills. In a first approach, these abilities-or tastes---can be considered as
mutually exclusive: an engineer interested in developing new technologies does not
like to spend time with the workers and needs to work alone; an engineer interested
in running a factory, concerned with social problems, will delegate the creative part
of the job. The "technologist" will look first at the quality of the products; while the
"manager" will also take human factors into account, giving the right incentives to
the workers. In this example let type 1 represent the "technologist" and type 2, the
"manager"; jobs 1 and 2 are "technical" jobs, job 1 (say, "laboratory") being more
technical than job 2 (say, "new technologies investigation"); job 3 can be taken as
"factory running" and job 4 "administrative management" ("organization"). Jobs 2
and 3 are the favorite ones of type 1 and type 2, respectively, because they
1994]
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ordered conversely: the geek would like to use her mathematical
abilities-but prefers job 3 which has more variety than the more
monotonous job 4.
The joint gains from trade are maximized if poets can be
assigned to job 2 and geeks can be assigned to job 3. But the par-
ties may have significant difficulties contracting for the first-best
outcome. 108 If an employer believes that it is equally likely that the
applicant is a geek or a poet, the employer's optimal strategy is to
offer no job' 0 9-which yields both types of applicants their lowest
possible payoff. To induce a job offer, therefore, the applicant
must be willing to communicate-or at least hint at-her type.
The job applicant is reluctant to reveal her abilities, however,
because the employer could take advantage of this information and
assign the employee to an overly specialized job. If an applicant
announces that she is a geek, the employer will be induced to offer
job 4. (Likewise, if an applicant announces that she is a poet, the
employer will offer job 1). The applicant would like to give the
employer some information about her abilities (to induce a job
offer), but would like to retain some mystery about her true type.
In game-theoretic terms, the applicant would like to send a "noisy
signal." Noisy signals benefit applicants because they can induce
correspond to their skill but also require some of the ability of the other type, to
make the job more interesting.
The example can arise in other contexts. Take the case where the informed player
is an important broker, knowing whether inflation (type 1) will occur or not (type 2).
The uninformed player is an investor who can invest in the following sectors: real
estate, stocks, bonds, or cash, corresponding to jobs 1 to 4, respectively. Here a no-
job decision corresponds to a change of broker. The broker's preferences are
obviously explained by the fact that he makes profits with investments in stocks or
bonds but wants to give good advice to keep his client.
Forges, supra note 106, at 378-79.
108 This makes the strong assumption that poets cannot offer to take a pay cut of "2" if
assigned to job type 2-changing the wage would change job 2 payoffs to (8,11), which
would induce first-best efficiency. Although this incentive to negotiate for a different wage
could in many contexts remove the strategic inefficiency, costs of making and enforcing
contracts could preclude these kinds of bargains. The point of this model is to show that
mediation might be a lower cost method of enhancing efficiency. For a mathematical proof
of this assertion, see id. at 389-90.
109 The employer obtains a certain return of 7 (by offering the job to another applicant)
which is strictly larger than the expected payoff of offering the more specialized jobs to
possibly unqualified applicants. The employer's expected payoff from assigning jobs 1 or 4
is 5 ((10+0)/2), whereas the expected payoffs from offering jobs 2 or 3 is 6.5 ((9+4)/2). See
id. at 378.
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employers to offer jobs 2 and 3. As already stated, if an employer
thinks it is equally likely that an applicant is a poet or a geek, the
employer will not offer a job. If the employer knows for sure that
the employer is a poet or a geek, jobs 1 or 4 will be offered. But if
the employer only is convinced that there is a 75% probability that
the applicant is a poet, the employer maximizes expected profits by
offering job 2.110 Correspondingly, the employer will offer job 3 if
the employer believes there is a 75% chance that the applicant is a
geek. Thus, when the employer is not certain about the applicant's
identity, jobs 2 or 3 can dominate because the employer would pre-
fer to avoid the zero payoff that they receive if they misassign jobs
1 or 4.
Applicants therefore would like to commit to sending such a
noisy signal-for example, by telling employers that they falsely
report their type one-quarter of the time. However, applicants will
have difficulty committing to this type of "mixed strategy" by
themselves."' An applicant would like to free ride on the "lying"
reputation of other applicants, but no applicant would like to lie
herself (and run the risk of being assigned a low payoff job)." 2
Employers, realizing this, will accordingly ignore "I might be lying"
statements and assign job 1 to any applicant who indicates that she
might be a poet (and job 4 to any applicant who indicates that she
might be a geek).
110 If the employer believes that there is a 75% probability that the applicant is a poet,
the expected profits from each possible assignment are:
Job I 7.5 (10 x .75 + 0 x .25)
Job 2 7.75 ( 9x.75 + 4 x .25)
No Job 7 (7x.75 + 7 x.25)
Job3 5.25 - (4x.75 + 9 x .25)
Job 4 2.5 ( 0x.75 + 10 x .25).
Job 2 is the optimizing employer assignment if the employer believes the probability that
applicant is a poet is between 60% and 80%. Job 3 will be assigned if the employer
believes the probability that the applicant is a poet is between 20% and 40%. See id. at
380-81.
I1I In game-theoretic terms, the "mixed" strategy is not "credible." See Kreps, supra
note 14, at 407-09.
112 The mixed strategy is not a stable (Nash) equilibrium, because individual applicants
would do better by telling the truth. Indeed, applicants have an incentive to bribe the
mediator not to lie, so that the applicant could receive the job 2 or job 3 outcome with
100% probability.
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Mediators can improve the gains from trade in this model by
making noisy signalling credible. Consider, for example, a media-
tor who promises to both parties to follow the following process:
1) The mediator first caucuses privately with the applicant and
asks the applicant to report her "type." The mediator (like the
employer) cannot independently verify whether the applicant is
telling the truth.
2) The mediator then caucuses privately with the employer and
follows a simple rule in passing on the applicant's report:
The mediator flips two coins (which the employer cannot see).
If at least one coin comes up head (which occurs 75% of the
time), the mediator faithfully reports what the mediator was told
by the applicant. However, if both coins come up tails (which
occurs 25% of the time), the mediator misreports what the appli-
cant said. Unlike the unmediated interaction, this mediated pro-
cess credibly adds noise to the applicant's signal.113
The mediation induces an equilibrium in which the applicants
tell their true type to the mediator and the employer assigns job 2
when the mediator says "poet" and job 3 when the mediator says
"geek." In this equilibrium, the applicants no longer have an
incentive to free ride on the noisy signals of others, because all
applicants send the mediator a true and precise signal of their abili-
ties. These applicant and employer strategies constitute a stable
equilibrium because (given that the other side plays the equilib-
rium strategy) neither party has an incentive to deviate. 1 4 Given
that the employer is going to assign job 2 if the mediator says poet,
poets will want to maximize the chance of that event by truthfully
reporting their type (and analogously for geeks). Given that appli-
cants are truthfully reporting their type (and knowing that the
mediator will misreport one-quarter of the time), the employer will
believe that the mediator's report is reliable three-quarters of the
time-and accordingly will assign the mediator-reported poets job
2 and mediator-reported geeks job 3.
This equilibrium allows the parties to enhance the expected joint
gains from trade. Without mediation, we showed that in equilib-
113 Unlike our earlier examples, the mediator here also has private information (about
the two coin flips).
114 In game-theoretic terms, these strategies constitute a Nash equilibrium. See
Fudenberg & Tirole, supra note 18, at 11.
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rium the applicants report their true type to the employers-but
that employers assign the applicants to jobs that do not maximize
the total gains from trade. In the unmediated equilibrium, the total
expected gains of trade are thus 16 (6 for the applicant and 10 for
the employer). With mediation, however, the applicants are
assigned to the first-best job three-quarters of the time and to the
third-best job one-quarter of the time. In the mediated equilib-
rium, the total expected gains from trade are 16.25 (= 19 x .75 + 8 x
.25). Thus, mediation can help induce greater expected gains from
the employment relationship. 115
This model of mediation captures several aspects of reality. The
mediator caucuses privately with the individual parties to the dis-
pute in order to acquire private information. The private parties
are induced to tell the mediator the truth. The model suggests how
mediators can create the conditions that will lead parties to make
such disclosures. Too often, ADR practitioners and scholars gloss
over this dynamic, seemingly assuming that with enough trust and
good faith in the mediator, the parties will begin to make confes-
sions and concessions. One mediation training manual, for exam-
ple, extols the benefits of the caucus but fails to explain how
mediators can maximize its benefits: "[O]ften the only way to
explore real positions is in private. A person is more willing to
reveal just what his or her bottom line is if there is no risk of
revealing his/her 'final' position to the other party."'1 6 Lon Fuller
similarly recognizes the importance of ex parte conferences
115 These additional gains are not equally distributed, however. The expected payoff for
the applicant is 8.5 (10 x .75 + 4 x .25) and the expected payoff for the employer is 7.75 (9 x
.75 + 4 x .25). The employer's expected payoff is lower with mediation than without (7.75
vs. 10). Thus, although mediation is ex ante efficient, it is not interim efficient: players that
do not yet know whether they would be employer or employee would agree to the
procedure. See supra text accompanying notes 69-71. People, however, always know
whether they are the employer or the applicant at the time of negotiation.
Applicants may be willing to pay the employers to participate in the job selection
mediation. For example, if the applicant paid the employer 2.30, the employer's payoff
would increase to 10.05 (which is higher than the employer's unmediated payoff of 10) and
the employee would retain 6.20 (which is higher than the applicant's unmediated payoff of
6). The same transactions costs that block other applications of the Coase theorem,
however, might also block voluntary agreement. See supra note 108. A legal mandate,
therefore, may be necessary to achieve the mediated equilibrium.
116 Center for Dispute Resolution, Mediation Training Manual 26 (1988) [hereinafter
Training Manual].
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between the mediator and each party, but fails to explain how the
mediator can use confidential information to "shape the negotia-
tions" without "premature disclosure of details":
[The mediator can hold] separate confidential meetings with the
parties, where each party gives the mediator a relatively full and
candid account of the internal posture of his own interests. Armed
with this information, but without making a premature disclosure
of its details, the mediator can then help to shape the negotiations
in such a way that they will proceed most directly to their goal,
with a minimum of waste and friction." 7
Those who practice and write about mediation know that
mediators add value to negotiations when they can elicit informa-
tion from the parties and work with that information to increase
the parties' gains from trade. Yet this process of collecting and syn-
thesizing information has been a mystery, of which a mediator
might say, "I can't describe it, but I know it when I see it."118
In the real world, mediators do not explicitly commit to proba-
bilistic lying. Mediators, however, often do indirectly disclose
information by innuendo and imprecise translation. Our examples
of imprecise translations show how "imprecise but true" and "pre-
cise, but probabilistically false" translations can mitigate adverse
selection inefficiency. As long as the listener is fully aware that the
mediator intends to lie a certain percentage of the time, either
form of noisy translation can be effective. Indeed, when the infor-
mation at stake has a dichotomous nature, the "precise, but
probabilistically false" translation may be the only way to send a
noisy signal. In the job selection game, for example, it would be
difficult for the mediator to make an "imprecise, but true" state-
ment." 9 This example underscores that the precise form of the
noisy translation will often determine whether the mediation will
be effective. These models only begin to rigorously capture the
117 Fuller, supra note 87, at 318.
118 To paraphrase Justice Potter Stewart in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964)
(Stewart, J., concurring) (discussing how to recognize obscenity).
119 While telling the seller that the buyer's report was not less than $50 was an effective
noisy signal, telling the employer that the applicant is not a geek conveys with precision
that she is a poet. When the informational category is dichotomous, the mediator cannot
create an overinclusive (fuzzy) translation by adding additional possibilities to the precise
report.
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nuanced ways that mediators can productively translate caucus
information.
This Part has shown that private (or asymmetric) information is
a but-for cause of adverse selection inefficiencies. We have pro-
vided a series of models to show how mediation can mitigate
adverse selection by committing mediators to translate imprecisely,
break off negotiations, and equally divide reported gains. Each
commitment was shown to facilitate more effective disclosure of
private information and thus mitigate a prerequisite of adverse
selection inefficiency.
II. MITIGATING THE INEFFICIENCIES OF MORAL HAZARD
Maximizing the gains from a contractual agreement often
requires coordinated performance by different contracting parties.
The contractual provisions themselves are often sufficient to effect
this coordination by specifying what each party will do and when.
Some aspects of performance, however, may be difficult to reduce
to enforceable provisions: one contracting party may not be able to
observe whether the other party took certain actions, and even if
the conduct is observable to the parties in privity, it may not be
verifiable to third parties (such as courts). 20
When contractual provisions fail to give the contractors legal
incentives to maximize the joint gains from trade, individual parties
may choose to maximize their individual returns-preferring, for
example, to shirk rather than to exert best efforts. This failure of
contractual incentives is often referred to as moral hazard. In the
insurance context, the failure of insurers to condition insurance on
insureds taking adequate care leads insureds to take too many risks
and too few precautions. In more general contractual settings,
120 Economists describe aspects of performance that can not be verified as "non-
contractible." See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 40, at 741. Promises to use "best efforts"
are classic examples of the difficulty of writing binding provisions, because it is so difficult
to measure a contracting party's degree of fulfillment of this promise. For example,
although courts often find that an exclusive dealing arrangement is supported by
consideration because the distributor has an implicit duty to "use reasonable efforts" to
sell the goods, see Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214, 215 (N.Y. 1917)
(Cardozo, J.), E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts 77-78 (2d ed. 1990), they will sometimes
refuse to imply such a duty. See HML Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 365 F.2d 77, 81 (3d
Cir. 1966). Inducements for appropriate action on part of the distributor must come from
nonlegal sources.
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moral hazard can undermine the ability of parties to efficiently
coordinate their performance. Just as hidden information is the
but-for cause of adverse selection, (contractually) hidden conduct
is the but-for cause of moral hazard.121
This Part shows how mediation can enhance contractual coordi-
nation and thus mitigate this form of moral hazard. To focus on
the inefficiencies of moral hazard, we purge our examples of pri-
vate information and consequently of any adverse selection. 22 We
provide two examples in which mediators enhance coordination by
sending both public and private signals to the individual parties.
Although these signals can easily be interpreted as recommenda-
tions, they differ from nonbinding arbitration both because they
are not rights-based adjudication,12 and because the mediator does
not expect the recommendation to be reduced to contract. To the
contrary, mediation to mitigate moral hazard is explicitly used as a
substitute for contract when contractual coordination of perform-
ance is not practicable.
These examples also illustrate that the information need not flow
only from one party to another during a mediation. The mediator
may herself create information and send it to the disputants. In
our stylized examples, the mediator creates a signal or recommen-
dation by flipping a coin or rolling a die and then discloses the
121 Commentators also sometimes refer to adverse selection and moral hazard as forms
of precontractual and postcontractual opportunism:
Adverse selection [refers] to the kind of precontractual opportunism that arises
when one party to a bargain has private information about the something that
affects the other's net benefit from the contract .... [Moral hazard refers] to the
form of postcontractual opportunism that arises when actions required or desired
under the contract are not freely observable.
Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 35, at 595, 601. Adverse selection is deemed to be precon-
tractual opportunism because the parties' private information exists prior to any contract,
whereas moral hazard is deemed to be postcontractual opportunism because the inability
to write detailed binding contracts distorts performance. It should be emphasized, how-
ever, that, foreseeing moral hazard problems, parties may fail to enter any agreement or
distort the terms of their agreement. Thus, in our mediation examples concerning moral
hazard, the parties' moral hazard is postcontractual only relative to some hypothetical or
implicit contract they might have entered but for the moral hazard.
122 When the parties have no private information about their characteristics, there is no
opportunity for the inefficiencies of adverse selection. But even without adverse selection,
trading inefficiencies can be caused by failures to coordinate behavior.
123 Although nonbinding arbitration could be used in an interest-based, deal-making
context, the far more frequent use is in dispute-settlement contexts.
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information to the disputants. We show not only that precise, pub-
lic disclosure can enhance mediation, but that noisy, private disclo-
sure of the mediator's information can be productive. Thus, noisy
translation (now of the mediator's information) can be effective in
mitigating moral hazard as well as adverse selection.
Finally, we show that mediation cannot mitigate all forms of
moral hazard inefficiency. Moral hazard as a failure of adequate
contractual incentives can potentially affect any executory aspect
of performance-even aspects only executory by one side of the
contractual relationship. All of our examples in which mediation
mitigates moral hazard consist of efforts to coordinate the future
conduct of multiple parties. Mediation can coordinate the conduct
of multiple parties, but we show that it cannot enhance the per-
formance of an individual party who, because of moral hazard, may
have insufficient incentives to behave optimally.
A. Mediators Can Efficiently Increase Coordination By Sending
Public Signals
The canonical coordination game is traditionally called "the bat-
tle of the sexes.' 24 Two players have a strong preference to spend
the evening together, but player 1 prefers to go the opera and
player 2 prefers the ballet. Table 3 depicts a normal form represen-
tation for this game (with arbitrarily chosen payoffs)."2 "0" rep-
resents a player's choice of going to the opera; "B" represents a
124 The traditional description includes gender-based stereotypes (e.g., the man prefers
to go to "the fights"). There is an unfortunate tendency for game-theoretic descriptions to
employ sexist images. For example, in discussing a hostage model designed to prevent
induced breach, Oliver Williamson suggests that "an ugly princess" might be an effective
hostage-because she would be valued by her father, but not by another king (because she
is ugly). See Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism 176-77 (1985)
("[A] king who is known to cherish two daughters equally and is asked, for screening
purposes, to post a hostage is better advised to offer the ugly one."). Another example is
provided by the title of this game, see Eric Rasmusen, Games and Information: An
Introduction to Game Theory 34 (1989), not only because of the original assumptions
about what activities the parties preferred, but also because the metaphor of "battle" is
used, rather than a metaphorical conflict or competition in which women are likely to
participate.
125 This game is based upon the example found in Rasmusen, supra note 124, at 34-35.
Unlike extensive-form representations (an example of which can be found in the
Appendix), normal form representations do not allow the depiction of sequential actions
that affect players' information. See Fudenberg & Tirole, supra note 18, at 85-87.
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player's choice of going to the ballet. If the players cannot commu-
nicate to coordinate their behavior, the only equilibrium will be a
pair of mixed strategies in which player 1 chooses to go to the
opera five-sixths of the time, and player 2 decides to go to the bal-
let five-sixths of the time.126 This "no communication" equilibrium
is massively inefficient because the players forego the benefits of
going to the same event 72% of the time.127 The expected payoff
to each player in this mixed-strategy equilibrium is only .83.128
There are tremendous gains from coordination--because either
of the coordinated equilibria (in which both go to the same event)
is Pareto superior to a "no communication" equilibrium. 129 Even
though player 1 strongly prefers going to the opera, this player pre-
fers attending the ballet with player 2 to the expected outcome of
the mixed-strategy equilibrium. While both parties realize that the
126 These mixed strategies are a Nash equilibrium. See Rasmusen, supra note 124, at 34.
If player 1 goes to the opera with probability 5/6, then player 2 is indifferent between
choosing the opera and the ballet (because the expected payoff of either choice is 5/6):
Player 2's Expected Payoff of Going To Opera = (5/6) xl + (1/6) x 0 = 5/6
Player 2's Expected Payoff of Going to Ballet = (5/6) x 0 + (1/6) x 5 = 516.
Player 2 then expects to receive the same profits-regardless of whether he goes to the
ballet 100% of the time, goes to the opera 100% of the time or mixes probabilistically
between these two venues. Given that player 1 follows her mixed strategy, player 2 then
has no reason to deviate from playing his mixed strategy. An analogous argument
establishes that player 1 has no incentive to deviate-so the mixed strategies constitute a
Nash equilibrium.
127 Player 1 goes to the opera and player 2 goes to the ballet with probability 25/36 (5/6 x
5/6) and player I goes to the ballet and player 2 goes to the opera with probability 1/36 (1/6
x 1/6).
128 Each player receives 5 with probability 5/36 and 1 with probability 5/36:
5 x (5/6) x (1/6) + 1 x (5/6) x (1/6) =
5 x (5/36) + 1 x (5/36) = 30/36 = 5/6 = .83.
129 Either coordinated equilibria is Pareto superior to the unmediated equilibrium,
because the expected return to each player is greater in either of the coordinated equilibria
than in the unmediated equilibrium. See Rasmusen, supra note 124, at 34-35.
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uncoordinated mixed-strategy equilibrium is dominated by either
pure strategy, they may have difficulty coordinating their behavior
even if they are allowed to communicate with each other. One can
imagine that in this "your place or mine" discussion, each side
would argue "but I think we should go to my preferred place."
And if neither party is able to commit to a course of action, there is
no natural end to the communication that would ensure that they
both go to the same venue."' 0
Mediation, however, can help to overcome this coordination
problem. Roger Myerson describes how this is possible:
[T]he mediator should toss a fair coin. If it is heads then [the medi-
ator] should recommend that [the players choose opera]; if it is
tails then the mediator should recommend that [the players choose
ballet]. Neither player could ever expect to gain by disobeying the
mediator's recommendations, if the other player is expected to
obey them.' 3 '
The nonbinding recommendations of the mediator allow the par-
ties to beneficially coordinate their behavior-even in circum-
stances when binding contracts might not be legally enforceable
(because they are not verifiable). The expected payoff to the par-
ties with mediation are 3,132 more than a three-fold improvement
over the unmediated mixed-strategy equilibrium. 133
As opposed to the rights-based adjudicatory function of binding
and nonbinding arbitration,'3 4 a mediator in this battle-of-the-sexes
130 In a real-world "battle of the sexes," external constraints and socialization might
impose an end to the communication and ensure that the couple would more frequently go
to the venue chosen by the man. Social scientists and legal scholars have observed that
women's socialization and resulting tendency to value relationships can lead them to
compromise their individual preferences more frequently than men are socialized to do.
See, e.g., Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's
Development 16-17, 4243 (1982); Deborah Tannen, You Just Don't Understand: Women
and Men in Conversation 149-87 (1990); Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process
Dangers for Women, 100 Yale LJ. 1545, 1577-78 (1991); Carol M. Rose, Women and
Property: Gaining and Losing Ground, 78 Va. L. Rev. 421, 445 (1992).
131 Roger B. Myerson, Multistage Games with Communication, 54 Econometrica 323,
327 (1986).
132 .5(5) + .5(1) = 3.
133 See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
134 See Fuller, supra note 79, at 29-30 (the objective of reaching a settlement is different
from that of rendering an award, and different information may be relevant to each
process). But note that many mediators will use a rights-based approach to reality
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game only needs randomly to select one of two signals and transmit
this signal to both parties. Indeed, the mediator doesn't even have
to know the meaning of the signals (say, "0" and "B"), as long as
the disputants do. Although the mediator in a sense makes a rec-
ommendation, this recommendation (unlike in nonbinding arbitra-
tions) is not intended to be solemnized by a subsequent contract.
To the contrary, the inability of the parties to write contracts that
coordinate this dimension of their behavior gives rise to the need
for mediation as a substitute for contract. 135
Although few mediators are instructed to flip coins before mak-
ing recommendations, the structure of some mediations resemble
this simple model: the parties realize that there are great gains
from coordinating their activity but disagree about how to coordi-
nate. The choice of an independent mediator can be interpreted as
choosing someone whose recommendations are hard to predict
with certainty. In practice, of course, the parties retain sufficient
control of the outcome that they can avoid feeling completely sub-
ject to the mediator's declarations. But the parties' agreement to
bring the dispute before a mediator might allow the parties to look
to the mediator's action as a focal point to coordinate their behav-
ior. The mediator is expected to recommend coordinated action-
but whether coordination will benefit one party or the other is left
to mediative chance.
The model also shows that the parties might voluntarily opt for
mediation. Thus, in contrast to our conclusion in the discussion of
the solicit offer game, it is not necessary legally to mandate media-
tion in order to ensure the players' participation. In the adverse
selection context, the parties' private information induced some
checking in mediation, comparing a party's position to the likely adjudicative outcome.
See Doyle & Haydock, supra note 5, at 91; Singer, supra note 5, at 20.
135 In the "battle-of-the-sexes" game, it seems that the parties could explicitly contract
to flip a coin (though even under this arrangement the neutral third party might serve as a
valuable witness). In other contexts, however, parties' performance will be
noncontractible because it is impossible or sufficiently difficult to prove to third parties
(such as a court) whether the conduct breaches an explicit or implicit agreement. The
"joint venture" mediation game provides a more natural example of noncontractibility.
Commentators have suggested that "battle-of-the-sexes" payoffs might arise in a variety of
contexts. See, e.g., Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interest of the
Child, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 39 n.116 (1987) (providing an anology to child custody
disputes); Randal C. Picker, Security Interests, Misbehavior, and Common Pools, 59 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 645, 661 (1992) (providing an analogy to creditor monitoring of debtors).
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disputants to resist efficient mediation. 136 But when the bargaining
inefficiency is caused solely by moral hazard, the private informa-
tion is less likely to impede voluntary acceptance of mediation pro-
cedures. Indeed, in the battle of the sexes game, the parties have
no private information and therefore no strategic barriers to con-
tractually committing to an efficient mechanism. 137 We will return
to the distinction between moral hazard and adverse selection
problems when we explore the legal implications of this analysis. 38
B. Mediators Can Enhance Coordination By Sending Private
Correlated-But-Noisy Signals
In the battle of the sexes game the mediator's recommendations
were made publicly, although there are contexts in which caucusing
privately with the parties is necessary to improve coordination.
Earlier we showed that mediators could create value by taking
information disclosed in a private caucus and transmitting a noisy
translation to the other side. In this Section we show that sequen-
tial caucusing can create value even if the parties do not disclose
any private information to the mediator: sequential caucusing can
be useful because it allows the mediator to send private messages
to the parties. Perversely, sending noisy signals to the individual
parties can enhance a mediator's ability to coordinate the dispu-
tants' behavior.
Consider a joint venture game in which two firms must decide
whether to make efforts to market a new product. The marketing
is a team effort and it is impossible for the firms to write an
enforceable contract that they will both work hard-because a
court cannot observe ex post whether either firm tried. 39
If both firms "try," they each expect to earn 80. If one firm
shirks and the other tries, the shirking firm earns 100 (by saving the
136 See supra Part I.A.3.
137 When there is no private information, there will be no distinction between ex ante,
interim, and ex post perspectives (the three terms are defined and distinguished in terms of
private information).
138 See infra text accompanying notes 161-71.
139 Of course, the parties might draft the contract to contain some standards for
performance that are objective and easily observable. But in many contracting situations,
it will not be possible to observe and verify all important aspects of performance. See
Ayres & Gertner, supra note 40, at 741.
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cost of effort), while the trying firm makes only 30.140 Finally, if
neither tries, the marketing fails and each firm's payoff is 0. The
normal form representation of this game is presented in Table 4.141
The joint gains from trade are maximized if both parties try. But






this is not an equilibrium outcome-if a firm believes that the
other firm is going to try, it will have an incentive (similar to the
incentives of the prisoners' dilemma game)' 42 to deviate from the
cooperative outcome and begin shirking.
140 For example, assume that the firms agree to split total revenues but must bear their
costs of effort individually: if both try, the total revenues are 300; if only one tries the total
revenues are 200; and if neither tries, the total revenues are 0. In addition, assume that the
cost of trying is 70, but that firms can avoid these costs if they shirk. These assumptions
generate the payoffs of Table 4:
If both firms try, each will have a net payoff of 80-half of the 300 total revenue
minus the 70 cost of trying (80 = (300/2) - 70);
If one firm tries while the other shirks, the trying firm's net payoff will be 30-half
of the 200 total revenue minus the 70 cost of trying (30 = (200/2) - 70);
If one firm shirks while the other tries, the shirking firm's net payoff will be 100-
half of the 200 total revenue minus the 0 cost of shirking (100 = (200/2) - 0);
If both firms shirk, each will have a net payoff of 0- because both the revenues
and the costs are 0.
141 This game is adapted from Robert J. Aumann, Subjectivity and Correlation in
Randomized Strategies, 1 J. Mathematical Econ. 67 (1974); see also Kreps, supra note 14,
at 411 (describing Aumann's correlated equilibrium).
142 Prosecutors might create a "'prisoners' dilemma' by telling each [prisoner] that he
will receive a favorable deal if he cooperates but that he will face full-scale prosecution if
he does not." Pamela S. Karlan, Discrete and Relational Criminal Representation: The
Changing Vision of the Right to Counsel, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 670, 693 (1992). Even though
stonewalling minimizes the total expected jail time, the prisoners' dilemma is that each
prisoner has an individual incentive to fink on the other. David A. Lax and James K.
Sebenius have analogized the prisoners' dilemma to a game they call the "negotiator's
dilemma." Here, the choice is between "creating value" (being open, sharing information
about preferences and beliefs, not being misleading about minimum requirements, and so
forth) and "claiming value" (being cagey and misleading about preferences, beliefs, and
minimum requirements; making commitments and threats; and so forth). Because the
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If the parties fail to achieve any form of coordination, the only
equilibrium is one in which the players make random choices about
whether to try or to shirk. In equilibrium, each firm will try 60% of
the time and will earn an expected payoff of 60.143
The parties could improve these payoffs by adopting the mini-
malist mediation process outlined above for the battle of the sexes
game-only here when the mediator's flip is heads, the mediator
would recommend that firm 1 try and that firm 2 shirk (with con-
verse recommendations when the flip is tails). This minimalist
mediation would increase the expected payoff for each player to
65.144
But there is another form of mediation that can produce even
larger expected gains from trade. Imagine that instead of flipping a
coin, the mediator rolls a die and without telling the parties what
number came up, goes to the individual firms and makes the pri-
vate recommendations listed in Table 5:
expected pay-offs of claiming value are greater than for creating value, each party will have
a strong incentive to claim, even though this strategy leaves joint gains on the table and
yields only a "mediocre" outcome for each. See David A. Lax & James K. Sebenius, The
Manager as Negotiator: Bargaining for Cooperation and Competitive Gain 29-35 (1986).
In the "joint venture" game, unlike the prisoners' (or negotiator's) dilemma, it is not a
dominant strategy for both firms to shirk. If a firm believed that the other firm was going
to shirk, it would be in the firm's interest to try. Even though there are great joint
incentives for coordinated trying, each firm has private incentives not to coordinate. A
firm will want to shirk if its opponent is trying; a firm will want to try if its opponent is
shirking. In the prisoners' dilemma game, on the other hand, if one party defects by
"finking" or "claiming value," this only increases the other party's incentive to do the
same.
143 For mixed strategies to be an equilibrium one firm's chance of shirking must make
the other firm indifferent between trying and shirking. Thus if the probability that firm 2
will try is equal to P, then:
Firm l's Expected Payoff from trying = 80 x P + 30 x (1-P)
Firm l's Expected Payoff from shirking = 100 x P + 0 x (1-P).
Setting these expected payoffs equal to each other and solving for P yields:
80 x P + 30 x (1-P) = 100 x P + 0 x (l-P)
50 x P +30 = 100 x P
P = 30150 = 0.6 = 60%.
The expected gains from trade in this equilibrium for each player equal the payoff for a
particular outcome multiplied by the probability of that outcome:
0 x (1 - 0.6) x (1 - 0.6) + 30 x (1 - 0.6) x (0.6) + 100 x (0.6) x
(1 - 0.6) + 80 x (0.6) x (0.6) = 60.
144 (30+100)/2 = 65. Following the mediator's recommendation is an equilibrium,
because deviating from a "shirk" recommendation reduces the payoff from 100 to 80 and
deviating from a "try" recommendation reduces the payoff from 30 to 0.
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TABLE 5: JoNrr VENTuRE MEDIATION MECHANISM
Mediator's Recommendations to Firms Conditional
on Roll of Die
Roll of Die
1 2 3 4 5 6
Firm 1 Try Try Try
Firm 2 Shirk Shirk Try T Tr y
So, for example, if the mediator rolls a 5, she recommends that firm
1 should shirk and that firm 2 should try.145 If a firm is told to
shirk, it knows with certainty that the other firm is being told to try.
Thus, if firm 1 hears a recommendation of "shirk," it knows that
the mediator must have rolled a 5 or a 6 and that the mediator will
recommend to firm 2 to try.
If a firm hears a recommendation of "try," however, it will know
only that there is a 50% chance the other firm was told to "try."
Thus, if firm 1 hears a recommendation of "try," it will know only
that the mediator rolled some number between 1 and 4-so that
half the time (if the roll was a 1 or a 2) firm 2 will be told to shirk,
and half the time (a roll of 3 or 4) firm 2 will be told to try.
Using this form of mediation can induce an equilibrium in which
the parties always follow the recommendations of the mediators.
Mediation helps the firms avoid the inefficiency of joint shirking
(which occurred at times in the mixed strategy equilibrium), and
induces both parties to "try" at the same time one-third of the time
(an outcome never achieved under the minimalist "coin-flip"
mediation).1 46
145 This mediation mechanism is identical to one using a three-sided die with
recommendations (try, shirk); (try, try); (shirk,try). The two mechanisms are identical
because with the six-sided die the recommendation for rolls 1 & 2, 3 & 4, and 5 & 6 are
identical. A six-sided die is used in this example because this type of die is more
commonplace.
146 The "coin-flip" mediation never caused both firms to try, because the mediator
always recommended that one firm try and one firm shirk. In the unmediated game, the
firm's self-interest induced each to try 60% of the time. Counterintuitively, in the
unmediated game, both parties try 36% of the time (= (0.6)2), which is a higher proportion
of the time than joint trying is observed in the noisy signal mediation (33.3%). But the
unmediated mixed strategies are only able to produce this high probability of joint
[Vol. 80:323380
HeinOnline -- 80 Va. L. Rev.  380 1994
Economic Rationales for Mediation
We can prove that following the mediator's recommendations is
an equilibrium by showing that neither party has an incentive to
deviate from the recommendation (given that the other firm fol-
lows the recommendation). There are two cases of interest. First,
if a firm hears a recommendation of "shirk," it knows with cer-
tainty that the other firm is being told to try. Given that the other
firm is going to follow its recommendation, a firm being told to
shirk will not deviate because it will expect to earn 100 if it follows
the shirk recommendation and only 80 if it decides to try instead.
The second case to consider is a firm that hears a recommenda-
tion of "try." A firm hearing "try" knows that half the time the
other firm will be told to try and half the time will be told to shirk.
Given that the other firm is expected to follow its recommenda-
tion, a firm told to try will not have an incentive to deviate because
it expects to earn 55 if it tries (the average of 30 and 80), and only
50 (the average of 100 and 0) if it shirks.147
The payoffs in Table 4 were structured so that it was difficult to
induce a firm to try if it believed that the other firm was going to
try as well. In the minimalist coin-flip mediation, the parties con-
ceded this difficulty and simply decided to achieve the limited effi-
ciency of inducing one firm to try. But in the die mediation, the
mediator can induce both firms to try one third of the time (when
the die is either 3 or 4) because parties told to try do not know
whether their opponent has been told to try or not. This mediation
mechanism is an example of what Aumann called a "correlated
strategy equilibrium,"' s because the mediator sends noisy but cor-
cooperation by accepting a high probability of joint shirking. In the unmediated game,
both firms shirk 16% of the time (= (0.4)2) and receive nothing, but this never happens
with coordinated signals mediation. See supra note 142.
147 More generally it would be possible to construct a random mechanism that told the
mediator to recommend:
(try, shirk) with probability pl,
(try, try) with probability p2, and
(shirk, try) with probability pi where 2 p, + p2 = 1,
and the bracketed terms indicate as follows: (recommendation to firm 1, recommendation
to firm 2). In die mediation, p, = p2. But even in the random mechanism mediation, it will
still be an equilibrium for the firms to follow the mediator's recommendation as long as p2
< (3/7). Setting p2 = 317 would increase each firm's expected gains of trade to 71.429 as
each firm would earn 80 with 3/7 probability and average 65 for the remainder of the time
(80 x (3/7) + 30 x (2/7) + 100 x (2/7) = 71.429).
148 Aumann, supra note 141, at 71.
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related signals (her recommendations) that do not always reveal
what she told the other side. 49
The correlated mediation mechanism creates an equilibrium with
higher expected gains from trade than under either the mixed strat-
egy or the minimalist "coin flip" mediation. Under the mixed-
strategy equilibrium the expected gains from trade were only 60
and under the coin flip mediation the expected gains are 65-but
with the correlated mechanism, the expected gains are 70.150
This correlated mediation mechanism has many distinguishing
features. First, the mediator is able to increase both firms' payoffs
even though the mediator is not able to observe the firms' behav-
ior. The mediator need neither trust nor verify. Second, the com-
munication of information flows solely from the mediator to the
individual private parties. In contrast to the job selection game
(where the mediator solicited information from the applicant), in
this mediation process the mediator has private information and
sends noisy signals to the parties about what her information is.
Moreover, the information flows from the mediator confidentially;
it is communicated to each party alone in private caucuses.
Although ADR practitioners also provide adjudicatory predictions
("reality checks") in nonbinding ADR, under this correlated medi-
ation mechanism the mediator's signals (recommendations) are not
predictive of an unmediated outcome. 1
The correlated recommendation of the mediator is also an exam-
ple of how mediation can be valuable as a form of face saving. The
individual firms can explain to their constituencies (say, sharehold-
ers) that there are significant expected benefits from following the
recommendations of the mediator-even if from time to time the
firm ends up being the only party that tries. The firm can make the
persuasive argument that it is better to be a coordinated sucker
149 The die mediation can also be interpreted as an additional example of a "precise, but
probabilistically false" signal: when the mediator recommends "try," she is effectively
saying "I told the other firm to shirk, but remember that I misrepresent the truth 50% of
the time."
150 The expected return for a firm equals the payoff for a particular outcome multiplied
by the probability that the outcome will occur in equilibrium:
30 x (1/3) + 100 x (1/3) + 80 x (1/3) = 70.
151 Shavell has shown that even nonpredictive binding arbitration may increase expected
gains from trade if it has lower transaction costs than formal litigation and has similar
expected outcomes. See Shavell, supra note 1, at 14-15.
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sometimes than it is to bear the costs of a less coordinated out-
come. The mediator then can serve as a scapegoat for the times
when the parties' payoffs turn out to be disproportionate. 5 2 But
again the firms should be pleased to accept this partial coordina-
tion when contractual attempts to induce joint effort are
unenforceable. 5 3
C. Mediators Cannot Mitigate Single-Sided Moral Hazard
Although there is a certain symmetry in our demonstration that
mediation can mitigate the twin foes of efficient contracting-
adverse selection and moral hazard-it is important to emphasize
that mediation as a substitute for contractual incentives can only
mitigate moral hazard when multiple parties need to coordinate
contractual performance. Moral hazard often distorts the incen-
tives of individual contracting parties to perform efficiently, as in
the canonical example of an insured person who takes too much
risk. Although mediation can enhance coordination when the con-
duct of more than one party affects the joint gains from trade,
mediation cannot change the incentives of a single party. Thus,
mediation can mitigate double-sided or multiple-sided moral haz-
ard, but not single-sided moral hazard. Mediators' ability to miti-
gate moral hazard is limited to the coordination of conduct.
In both the battle of the sexes and the joint venture games,
mediators were able to establish more efficient equilibria by chang-
ing the perceived costs of acting inefficiently. In the battle of the
sexes mediation, the mediator's announcement of "opera" or "bal-
let" changed the players' perception of the payoffs associated with
each choice. Once the mediator announces "opera," the player
who prefers ballet can be reasonably certain that the only way to
spend the evening with the other player is to go to the operaY.5 4
152 Often mediators play the role of scapegoat to allow parties out of an untenable
position or to explain themselves to constituencies. See Deborah M. Kolb, The Mediators
24 (1983); Rogers & Salem, supra note 7, at 36; Singer, supra note 5, at 20; Susskind &
Cruikshank, supra note 10, at 140.
153 See Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict 71 (1960) ("If one is to make a
finite concession that is not to be interpreted as capitulation, he needs an obvious place to
stop. A mediator's suggestion may provide it .... ).
154 The ballet-preferring player's belief is reasonable because there would be little
reason that the opera-preferring player would deviate from the recommendation
(proposed equilibrium) that both go to the opera.
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Given her preferences for companionship and her new, mediated
beliefs about the other player's action, going to the opera becomes
the clear choice. Mediation was effective because it changed each
player's belief about how the other player was likely to behave.
This was also true in the joint venture mediation. Without medi-
ation, each firm believed that the other firm was likely to shirk
forty percent of the time. Under mediation, however, firms that
received a "try" recommendation believed that there was a 50%
chance that the other firm would shirk. Perversely, increasing the
belief that the other firm will shirk increases a firm's willingness to
follow the mediator's "try" recommendation. 155
If, however, the joint gains from contracting turn on only one
party's performance, mediation cannot affect that party's belief
about how others will act, because other players have no other
action left to take. Returning to the insurance example, mediation
would not be effective in changing the incentives of an insured to
take inefficient risks, because it is difficult to imagine how media-
tion would change an insured's belief about how an insurer will
act.156 Mediation is only effective when the players' payoffs are
contingent on more than one person's conduct.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR LAWMAKERS AND PRAcrrrIoNERs
This Article's analysis can inform our choice of legal rules to
govern the mediation process. This Section explores the proper
scope of mandatory mediation, professional standards regarding
confidentiality, and the appropriate contractual rules governing the
mediator's contract with the disputants. We also suggest how
mediators can implement some of our results to create value.
These stylized suggestions are not a call for legislation or common
law rulemaking. Our analysis illustrates, however, how economic
155 A firm believing that the other firm has a 50% probability of "shirking" expects to
earn 55 from "trying" but only 50 from "shirking." See supra note 147 and accompanying
text. Unlike the players in a prisoners' dilemma, a firm will want to try if it believes that
the other firm is going to shirk. This is because the profits from being the only firm to try
can still be larger than the cost of trying. See supra note 140 (showing if one firm trying
will produce gross profits of 200, it is worthwhile for one firm to expend 70 on effort-even
if it knows other firm is going to shirk).
156 One might, however, be able to imagine that the insurer's future decision on whether
to be "generous" or "stingy" in paying claims might be a type of executory performance
subject to coordination through mediation.
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rationales could support certain approaches to mediation regula-
tion and practice.
A. Mandatory vs. Voluntary Mediation
An important implication of both the battle of the sexes game
and the joint venture game is that the parties had an incentive to
opt for mediation voluntarily. When mediation enhanced gains
from trade by fostering more coordinated behavior (mitigating the
effects of moral hazard), the parties had a mutual incentive to
agree to mediation. Mandatory (including court-ordered) media-
tion was not necessary. 5 7 Moral hazard does not need to be cured
by mandatory mediation, because voluntary mediation processes
should be adopted by the parties when the processes create value.
This finding, however, sharply contrasts with the results of the
adverse selection games. In those games, certain types of players
would resist voluntarily adopting mediation schemes that enhanced
ex ante efficiency. Moreover, the resistance of these players could
by itself destroy the value-creating properties of mediation for the
remaining players. 58 The same private information that created a
barrier to resolving the underlying dispute could also create a bar-
rier to the voluntary adoption of efficient mediation mecha-
nisms. 159 On the other hand, when there is a problem of
coordination (or moral hazard) the inefficiencies are not caused by
private information, and there is not the same reason to suspect
157 See Susan M. Leeson & Bryan M. Johnston, Ending It: Dispute Resolution in
America 141 (1988) (discussing different contexts where mediation is mandated, including
labor contracts and divorce); Andree G. Gagnon, Ending Mandatory Divorce Mediation
for Battered Women, 15 Harv. Women's L.J. 272, 282-90 (1992) (discussing a variety of
statutes that mandate mediation in divorce and custody matters); Grillo, supra note 130, at
1547 & n.4 (explaining that in some states divorcing couples are required by statute or local
rule to enter mandatory mediation to resolve custody disputes). Even "binding"
arbitration clauses may not be as mandatory as some of the mediation programs that have
evolved. Under the Federal Arbitration Act, for example, one party can trigger the
enforcement of an arbitration clause over the other party's preference to go to court by
filing a motion to stay and to compel arbitration. If both parties choose to stay in court,
however, they can mutually "opt out" by waiving the arbitration clause. See 9 U.S.C. § 3
(1992).
158 The equilibrium of the solicit offer mediation, for example, might unravel if the high-
valuing sellers and the low-valuing buyers were allowed to opt out of the mediation
process. See supra text accompanying notes 71-75.
159 See supra Part I.A3.
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that the parties would be unwilling to participate in value-enhanc-
ing mediation. 160 Thus, mandatory mediation may be needed to
mitigate the inefficiencies of adverse selection but is contraindi-
cated when the inefficiency at stake is moral hazard (or a failure to
coordinate the players' behavior).
It should be emphasized that adverse selection inefficiency is a
necessary, but clearly not a sufficient, condition for mandatory
mediation. As is always the case, the costs of imperfectly imple-
menting a mandatory regime may outweigh the benefits of any
intervention' 161 especially since our examples suggest that the
mediator might be given the power to terminate negotiations. 62
The wisdom and feasibility of mandated mediation also turns
upon the context of the dispute or deal subject to mediation. Frank
Sander and Jeffrey Rubin have noted the distinction between "dis-
pute settlement" and "deal making" negotiation. 63 Mandatory
mediation is particularly appropriate when a dispute involves par-
ties that did not choose to transact business with each other, as in
most tort cases. Mandating mediation in such cases may be wise
because the parties involved could not have agreed to resolve their
case through mediation prior to the occurrence giving rise to the
dispute. 64 Hence, they fit the model we have sketched of parties
160 Moral hazard inefficiency is caused by the inability to write enforceable contracts
regarding certain aspects of contract formation. But the inability to write a contract about
substantive performance should not undermine the parties' ability to adopt a contract
about a mediation procedure.
Of course, many disputes will involve elements of both moral hazard and adverse
selection. The private information that creates the adverse selection may be sufficient to
keep the disputants from solving their moral hazard problems.
161 For discussion of the ways mandatory mediation in the divorce context might impose
costs disproportionately on women, see generally Gagnon, supra note 157; Grillo, supra
note 130.
162 Underestimating the costs of government regulation has been termed by Harold
Demsetz as the "nirvana fallacy." See Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency:
Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1969); see also Jennifer G. Brown, Posner,
Prisoners, and Pragmatism, 66 Tul. L. Rev. 1117, 1147 n.136 (1992) (discussing its
application in civil remedies); Fred McChesney, Economics, Law, and Science in the
Corporate Field: A Critque of Eisenberg, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1530, 1543 & n.45 (1989)
(discussing same in corporate law).
163 See Sander & Rubin, supra note 25.
164 But some Fortune 500 companies have signed a pledge in which they agree ex ante
that if they get into any sort of legal dispute with another signatory of the pledge, they wil
attempt to resolve the dispute through some form of ADR before filing suit. See Center
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who have private information before the time comes to agree to
mediation.
When, on the other hand, the subject of the parties' negotiation
is their future relationship, the parties may be able to agree to
mediation voluntarily. 65 If a state wanted to mandate mediation
in order to reduce inefficiencies caused by adverse selection, it
might regulate the formation of applicable contracts so that only
contracts that were the product of a mediation would be enforcea-
ble. This would not enable anyone to force another into mediation
simply by proposing a contract, but it would require that if both
parties wanted to form an enforceable contract, they would have to
use the mediation process to do so.
Our analysis also suggests that the benefits of mandatory media-
tion might often be achieved by making mediative participation
merely a default. 66 For example, lawmakers might imply a default
mediation provision into construction contracts in the absence of
explicit words to the contrary. Making a mediation agreement an
implicit part of an underlying contract would mean that the default
mediation provisions would be binding unless both parties explic-
itly opted out of the mediation coverage. 167
The current policy debate regarding mandatory versus voluntary
mediation usually ignores this intermediate possibility. Under
mandatory schemes, the mediation process becomes an immutable
rule that cannot be altered even by joint agreement. Under volun-
tary schemes, the default rule is that there is no mediation unless
both parties opt in. Under a mediation default, however, an indi-
vidual disputant could insure that the mediation agreement was
binding by refusing to agree to another procedure.
Properly crafted mediation defaults could retain many of the
advantages of mandatory mediation. The same private information
that makes it difficult for disputants to contract around the current
for Public Resources, CPR Legal Program to Develop Alternatives to Litigation Brochure
(1993).
165 As health care providers increasingly turn to ADR mechanisms for the resolution of
cases, they may ask customers to agree to mediation prior to treatment, which could have
the effect of transforming a tort case into the sort that could be subjected to mediation by
voluntary agreement before the parties gain private information.
166 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 33.
167 Contracting out could occur at the time of the initial agreement or at the time of a
later dispute.
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default and affirmately opt for efficient mediation might also make
it difficult for them to contract away from an efficient mediation
default. Individual parties may be deterred from proposing less
efficient mechanisms, because making such offers may reveal
adverse information about their respective valuations.
Solicit offer mediation, however, does not have this "sticky"
characteristic. Sellers whose cost is greater than $75 and buyers
whose value is less than $25 expect never to trade under solicit
offer mediation. 68 These negotiators have nothing to lose by
offering to opt out of solicit offer mediation-especially because
revealing their types signals that trade will need to take place at a
more favorable price.169 Moreover, we showed that in solicit offer
mediation, once the parties can infer each other's value, they may
have a mutual incentive to contract around a mediator's order to
terminate negotiations. To be effective, mediated instructions to
terminate negotiations must not be subject to contractual
modification. 70
Thus, while the current debate regarding mandatory mediation
can be faulted for excluding the possibility of mediation defaults,
an economic analysis does not exclude the possibility that
mandatory mediation might improve bargaining efficiency.' 7'
Indeed, one of the powers of our analysis is that by distinguishing
adverse selection and moral hazard inefficiencies, it suggests a
method for limiting the scope of such intervention.
B. Cracking the Chinese Wall of Confidentiality in Caucusing
A second implication of our analysis stems from our insight that
mediators can add value to the negotiation process by revealing
private information indirectly and imprecisely. The process of col-
lecting and distributing caucus information can give rise to ques-
tions about a mediator's (implicit or explicit) duties under a
mediation contract to maintain the confidentiality of information
revealed in caucus.
168 See supra text accompanying notes 65-66.
169 Sellers with a high cost signal that the price needs to be high, and buyers with a low
value signal that the price needs to be low.
170 See supra text accompanying notes 77-79.
171 But see Bernstein, supra note 1, at 8 (arguing in economic terms that mandating
court-annexed nonbinding arbitration is unwarranted).
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Various professional standards of confidentiality could be
applied to the caucus and the information that emerges there. One
standard could be that the mediator not only is barred from dis-
closing the information to the other party, but also is forbidden to
use the information in any way-such as formulating questions for
the other side, exploring lines of possible agreement, or structuring
proposals for agreement. 72 This would be the most restrictive,
impenetrable "Chinese wall" type of confidentiality that would
prevent the mediator from giving the parties even a benign reassur-
ance that they have room for agreement.173
A more flexible standard for confidentiality seems to have
emerged in current practice: the mediator has discretion indirectly
to reveal information disclosed in caucus, with the exact contours
of the mediator's discretion remaining poorly defined. Because the
strictest forms of Chinese wall confidentiality do not allow the
mediator to make any use of the caucus information, it seems
unlikely that the parties would want the mediation contract to
impose this extreme standard of confidentiality. 74 Thus, a flexible
standard may comport more with the hypothetical approach to
contractual governance, which attempts to fill gaps with the provi-
sions for which the parties would have contracted. 75
Although this flexible standard has considerable appeal, our
analysis suggests that it may be necessary for mediators to give the
disputants more specific information about how the mediator
intends to use caucus information. 76 Credibly describing how the
172 Cf. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rules 1.6, 1.9 (1983) (forbidding lawyers
either to reveal or to use client confidences for the lawyer's own gain).
173 Such a statement, after all, would reveal that the parties' reservation prices overlap
and that a zone of agreement exists.
174 If the mediator were not allowed to take confidential information into account in any
way, the parties would have no incentive to disclose private information. The more
sensible inference to draw from their disclosure is that the parties have some expectation
that the mediator will make use of the information without actually disclosing it, and that
this use will facilitate agreement.
175 See David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract
Interpretation, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1815 (1991).
176 All of our mediation games make the assumption that the mediation process is
common knowledge. This is stronger than merely assuming that each party knows about
the mediation process; it also assumes that each party knows that the other party knows,
and that each party knows that each one knows that the other party knows, and so on. See
John Geanakoplos, Common Knowledge, 6 J. Econ. Persp. 53 (1992).
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information will be used may be necessary to induce the dispu-
tants' to disclose accurate information. The common practice of
claiming confidentiality and then indirectly disclosing may under-
mine the individual parties confidence that their disclosures will
not be used against them.
We tentatively suggest that the default confidentiality standard
should be stricter than the one currently used. We propose a "pen-
alty" default meant to encourage mediators to notify disputants
more explicitly about how the mediators intend to use (and not
use) caucus information.177 Mediators would need to give notice of
how they intended to use caucus information before soliciting this
information. A strict confidentiality default would not necessarily
reduce a mediator's discretion: some mediators, for example, retain
the discretion to disclose any caucus information unless explicitly
instructed to the contrary.' 78 But it would require mediators to
give the disputants notice that such broad discretion was being
retained. This strict confidentiality default might be particularly
useful because many disputants are uninformed about the real
rules of the game and because there seems to be a large gap
between the confidentiality talk of practitioners and their actual
practice.
In contrast to our discussion of mandatory mediation, our pref-
erence is that the confidentiality standard be mutable by private
agreement. 179 Because the strict confidentiality default is intended
to encourage explicit contracting, it is especially important that the
explicit efforts to contract around a default be honored by the
177 The term penalty default is extensively discussed in Ayres & Gertner, supra note 33.
Penalty defaults are intentionally chosen to depart from the hypothetical contract choice in
order to encourage the parties to provide more information by contracting around the
default standard. In this instance, the strict confidentiality standard would encourage the
mediator to give notice that a different mediation procedure would be used.
178 It is the practice of some mediators to ask a party at the end of the caucus, "Is there
anything that you've just told me that you want me to keep from the other side at this
time?" Others tell the parties that they will keep all of the caucus communications private
unless the party gives them explicit permission to reveal specific pieces of information. See
Training Manual, supra note 116, at 26 ("Tell them everything they say will be kept
confidential unless they instruct otherwise."). Apparently, mediators disagree about
whether the approach taken makes any practical difference.
179 However, when a mediation is mandatory, the law may also need to place limits on
the ways that the parties may alter the process to make it meaningless.
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courts. As we demonstrated above,180 mediators can increase the
expected gains from trade when they enforce commitments to
break off negotiations when private revelations are not sufficiently
optimistic. The most straightforward way to make such a commit-
ment credible is to empower mediators by explicit contract. Yet
given current judicial practice, the enforcement of such a contract
would not be without doubt. 18
C. Implications for Practitioners
Although practitioners have been adept at recognizing how
mediation can overcome psychological barriers to dispute resolu-
tion,1 82 this Article suggests additional techniques that may be use-
ful in overcoming strategic (or economic) barriers. In practice,
mediators will almost always be confronted with both strategic and
psychological barriers and thus will need to balance competing
methodologies. At times, mediators may even be able to enhance
efficiency by dissuading individual players from adopting hyper-
rational strategies that lead to pathological equilibria. 83
Our focus on noisy disclosure also suggests many avenues for
mediation training and practice. Mediators need to think more
180 See supra text accompanying notes 59-62.
181 For a discussion with examples of this judicial tendency toward nullification, see
Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the
Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 261, 271-72
(1985).
182 See Mnookin & Ross, supra note 4.
183 For example, the tit-for-tat strategy may be a technically irrational strategy for any
individual player to adopt in any individual round of the prisoners' dilemma game, but it
may well lead to higher joint gains if the mediator can induce both sides to play. See
Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (1984) (devising the tit-for-tat strategy as a
way out of the prisoners' dilemma in multiple rounds of the game). But see Goldberg,
Sander & Rogers, supra note 79, at 60-61 (suggesting that provocability and retaliation
may work as a tit-for-tat strategy when playing against a computer, but that such strategies
could back-fire when used against people, even when multiple rounds allowed for a player
to be "forgiving" following the other's defection and subsequent reform).
Further research may be able to illuminate the tradeoff between psychological and
strategic barriers by embedding our rational choice models within the more general
psychological models of prospect theory. See Lee Ross, Reactive Devalution in
Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, in Barriers to the Negotiated Resolution of Conflict,
supra note 4, at ch. 2; Amos Tversky & David Kahneman, Conflict Resolution: A
Cognitive Perspective, in Barriers to the Negotiated Resolution of Conflict, supra note 4,
at cli. 3; Amos Tversky & David Kalneman, Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative
Representation of Uncertainty, 5 J. Risk & Uncertainty 297 (1992).
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carefully about how their use of caucus information will affect the
quantity and quality of privately revealed information. Mediators
seldom inform the disputants how they will put such information to
use 8--and lack of certainty about the mediator's modus operandi
may deter parties from coming forward.
Instead of giving lip service to standards of confidentiality which
by necessity must be breached, we suggest that mediators should
focus on the relative efficacy of different ways of making noisy
translations. We have shown that both "imprecise, but true" and
"precise, but probabilistically false" translations could serve to
overcome adverse selection inefficiency. The latter, which also
might be termed commitments to probabilistically lie, is especially
provocative, but may be necessary to induce private revelation
concerning some dichotomous piece of information (that is, when
the information is either X or not-X, and cannot be expressed in
more general terms). In our job selection game, the information
related to whether the applicant was a poet or a geek, but we can
imagine other contexts as well. 85
Although much of our inquiry has focused on private informa-
tion in dealmaking, our analysis of adverse selection also applies to
more traditional dispute resolution settings. For example, when
couples divorce, each parent may have private information about
his or her preference for custody. Distinctions between the types
of custody could create "types" of disputing parents: those who
want 1) full custody for themselves; 2) joint custody; or 3) full cus-
tody in the other parent (with rights of visitation for themselves).
Adverse selection may lead both parents to demand full custody-
even if they do not want it-because each may fear that conceding
full custody will allow the other parent to exploit the concession.1 6
A mediator might use a form of disclosure analogous to the job-
selection game in order to mitigate the effects of this adverse
selection.
184 Indeed, materials about mediation often mention the caucus as an important part of
the process, but do not outline the way a mediator ought to explain the special rules of
confidentiality that adhere.
185 For example, the mediator's recommendation in the joint venture game was also
dichotomous: try or shirk. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
186 See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale LJ. 950, 972-73 & n.77 (1979).
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Although our game-theoretic analysis is highly reductive, it high-
lights the importance of private information and the mediator's
role as a conduit for this information. Because information is the
raw material of the mediator's craft, the game-theoretic models of
strategic interaction are especially well suited to give mediators an
additional perspective on the consequences of their activity.
CONCLUSION
Private information and the inability of parties to write enforcea-
ble provisions regarding certain aspects of performance lead to the
twin evils of adverse selection and moral hazard. Rational actors
may not be able to avoid these inefficiencies by direct negotiation.
This Article has shown, however, that mediation can mitigate both
adverse selection and moral hazard.
Mediation can mitigate adverse selection by increasing the
amount and quality of information that private parties choose to
disclose. Mediators can induce more disclosure by limiting the
ability of the other party to adversely exploit the information. In
particular, we showed that soliciting offers to split the reported
gains from trade and commitments to transmit only noisy transla-
tions could increase the parties' individual incentives to reveal
information. A mediator's commitment to "add noise" to the dis-
closures can perversely enhance the quality of the parties' commu-
nications because without such commitments the parties might
choose to disclose nothing.
We also showed that allowing mediators to terminate negotia-
tions when the reported valuations were not sufficiently optimistic
could also increase the expected gains from trade by inducing more
truthful valuations. The threat of termination dampens both the
buyers' usual incentive to understate their reservation price and
the sellers' usual incentive to overstate theirs. This countervailing
incentive, created by the threat of termination, increases the costs
of private misrepresentation and reduces the inefficiencies of
adverse selection.
Mediation can mitigate moral hazard by enhancing the parties'
abilities to coordinate performance. In the joint venture game, for
example, mediators sent noisy recommendations to the parties to
alter their beliefs about how their opponents would act. Simulta-
neously changing both parties' beliefs could make certain kinds of
1994]
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coordinated performance possible that would not have been possi-
ble by direct communication. Yet we also showed that a mediator's
ability to mitigate moral hazard inefficiency was limited to issues of
coordination. Mediation can only dampen the moral hazard incen-
tive by altering one player's beliefs about how another player will
act. It cannot dampen moral hazard when only one party's incen-
tives need to be improved.
Our core examples of solicit offer, job selection, and joint ven-
ture mediation showed that mediators could create value not by
adjudicating claims or proposing contractual settlements, but by
mediating the flow of information between the parties. These
models illustrate how mediators can use private caucusing to send
one party a noisy translation of the other party's disclosure or to
send both parties a noisy (but correlated) signal about the media-
tor's recommended equilibrium.
Our suggestion (from the job selection game) that mediators
might create value by lying some proportion of the time will strike
many as offensive. Our reductive assumption of probabilistic mis-
representation is only a crude way of illustrating the myriad of
nuanced ways that mediators may be able to indirectly reveal infor-
mation. Far from undermining the ethical duties of mediators, our
purpose is to place mediation ethics on a firmer footing. Indirect
and incomplete revelation of information is central to any eco-
nomic rational for mediation. Mediation ethics should recognize
this core function and seek to frankly inform private parties and
the mediators themselves about the appropriate forms and extent
of such disclosure.
Although mediators can create value in many ways, we have
focused on sequential caucusing because other ways that mediators
create value are not distinctively mediative"1 7 or do not provide an
187 Mediators, for example, may usefully provide individual disputants with reality
checks. But reality checks often resemble nonbinding arbitration in attempting to predict
the outcome of binding adjudication.
One dissimilarity, however, that is worth exploring concerns whether the submissions
are public or private. Nonbinding arbitration is usually based upon submissions that are
disclosed to the other side as well as the arbitrator, whereas mediated "reality checks" and
similar assessments are more often based on a combination of public and private
submissions. One reason for this distinction is that arbitrated predictions are usually right-
based whereas mediated predictions are more often interest-based. Cf. Fuller, supra note
79, at 37-41 (giving a similar comparison of when arbitration and mediation are most
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explanation for how mediators can facilitate trade among rational
actors.8 8 Although others have succeeded in identifying how
mediators can reduce noneconomic barriers,1 8 9 and economists
have succeeded in rationalizing other forms of alternative dispute
resolution,190 we hope this paper will serve as a bridge between the
diverging literatures and provide a basis for further research.
appropriate). It may be that adjudication based on private submissions might qualify as
another distinctly mediative function that deserves independent analysis.
188 As discussed in the Introduction, neither strict Chinese wall mediation nor precise
transmittal provide economic explanations for how a mediator can enhance the gains from
trade.
189 See Mnookin & Ross, supra note 4; sources cited supra notes 5 and 6.
190 See Bernstein, supra note 1; Shavell, supra note 1.
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APPENDIX
This Appendix explicitly derives the equilibria for three games
described in the text: the unmediated "take-it-or-leave-it" negotia-
tions;191 the solicit offer mediation;192 and the mediation with
"imprecise, but true" translations. 93
A. The Unmediated Asymmetric Bargaining Model
Consider a game in which the players, consisting of a buyer B
and a seller S, possess private information regarding their reserva-
tion prices. Player B is assumed to value the good at v dollars.
Player S is assumed to face a cost of c dollars for delivery of the
good. "v" and "c" (the players' "types") are distributed indepen-
dently according to a uniform distribution between $0 and $100.
Both agents are risk neutral. The seller is assumed to have com-
plete bargaining power, in that she makes one take-it-or-leave-it
proposal (p) to the buyer, which can either be accepted or rejected
by the buyer. Making this offer, however, is costly to S, and she
must pay $g if she makes an offer. The seller's cost of making
offers is common knowledge. The extensive form representation
of this unmediated game is depicted in Figure 6.
191 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
192 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
193 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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FIGuI 6





We will now calculate the equilibrium strategies. The seller will
make an offer, p, that maximizes her expected surplus, if indeed
she decides to make an offer. Thus, the seller's objective function,
assuming she makes an offer, is the following:
M axp 0,1F(p)(p-c)- x - M axp qto] (100 -P (p-c)- Rx (4)
Taking the derivative of (4) with respect to p, we find the first
order condition for expected profits is:
(lO0-p) (p-c) 0 0 (5)
100 100
which implies that the optimal bid p* for seller S of type c who
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This yields an expected profit for the seller (contingent on making
a bid) of:
(c) 100-c) 2  (7)
400
Assuming this expected profit is nonnegative, then the seller will
propose p*(c) in equilibrium.
The seller will not make an offer, however, if the expected profit
in Equation 7 is negative. It is easily verified that the only sellers
who refuse to make offers are the ones for which:
7r,(c) > 0 = c > 100-20-4j (8)
The optimal offering strategy for the seller in this game is thus:
a*(c) = ~f offer p*(c) for c < 100-20a]-9
L no offer else
Yielding expected profits for player S:
E 7(c) = (100-c)2/400 - p for c :S 100-20-i(
I./0 else
Note that the seller's optimal strategy implies that no buyers
with v < 50 will ever receive an acceptable bid from the seller. In
essence, the seller excludes these buyers from participating in the
market, because there is still a relatively large buyer probability
mass above v = 50, and thus the promise of capturing a large frac-
tion of the distribution of the surplus. This conclusion is consistent
with the finding that for many bargaining games, the "spread" that
is necessary between the buyer's and seller's valuations to achieve
trade effectively eliminates low valuers from the market altogether,
and focuses on the "upper tail" of the distribution.194
Given the strategy of the seller, the expected payoffs of the
buyer are given by equation (11):
194 See Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car
Negotiations, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 817 (1991); Chattejee & Samuelson, supra note 43.
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0 for v<50(v-50)2  for 50 < v _< +100
E tB(v) = 100 2 where a = 100-20 Fg (11)
y- (v-50-E) for v> d+100
The first region of this profit function represents the buyers whose
reservation price is lower than the sellers' minimum offer. The sec-
ond region represents the case in which the buyer may receive
either unacceptable or acceptable bids from the seller. If the bid is
unacceptable, his payoff is zero; if acceptable, his payoff is the dif-
ference between his valuation and the bid. The third region repre-
sents the case where the buyer's type is so high that he knows he
will receive an acceptable bid from all sellers who choose to bid.
In this unmediated game with uniform distributions, the
expected (ex ante) social surplus Su(g) is:
= 25 W f2 (12)
2 10
B. Solicit Offer Mediation
Chatterjee and Samuelson showed that when the buyer and seller
play the optimal strategies, 195 the expected interim payoffs equal:
rb(V) = (v-25)2  and i,(c)- (c-75)2 (13)200 200
Integrating these interim payoffs with respect to the possible reser-
vation prices yields the "ex ante payoffs."
nb(v) = ic.(c) - 5625 = 7.03 (14)
8
The total expected gains from trade simply equal 14.06, the sum of
the buyer's and seller's expected payoffs (14.06 = 7.03 + 7.03). The
ex ante payoffs from the unmediated take-it-or-leave-it game can
be calculated by integrating Equations 7 and 11 and equal 8.33 and
4.16 for the seller and buyer, respectively.
195 See supra notes 54 and 55.
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C. Mediation With "Imprecise, But True" Translations
FIGuPj 7








I Payoffs: (Buyer, Seller) I
Suppose now that instead of soliciting offers, the mediator
merely solicits a precise, private report of the buyer's reservation
price. If the reported value is less than 50, the mediator terminates
the negotiation. If the reported reservation price is greater than
50, the mediator discloses: "The buyer's reported value was greater
than 50" and allows the same unmediated bargaining to proceed
(which as above was a take-it-or-leave-it seller offer. The extensive
form representation of this game is depicted in Figure 7.
We now describe an equilibrium of the game depicted above. In
this equilibrium, all buyers report their precise reservation price.
400 [Vol. 80:323
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Hence, for the buyers, truth-telling is an optimal strategy.196 The
optimal bidding strategy for the seller, pM*, in this mediated game
for the seller is now:
aM*(C) = ( +100)/2 for eelse _- 2 . (15)
yielding expected payoffs:
E IrSM(e) = (100-c)2/400 - p/2 for c < c e0 else where c* - -O . (16)
The mediator's noisy translation enables more sellers to make
offers, as c* > F_
The buyer's expected payoffs are type-dependent as well, and
similar in form to the unmediated game. For a buyer of type v, this
expression is given below:
0 for v< 50
V_50)2C*+100for 50 < v < _*+100
E BNM(V) =100 - 2 (17)c* _ c*+100
(v-50--) for v>
The expected (ex ante) social surplus in this mediated game,
SM(.t), can be found by integrating the buyer's and seller's expected
profits and equals:
196 This is but one Bayesian Perfect Equilibrium of the game. See Fudenberg & Tirole,
supra note 18, at 210 (defining this equilibria concept). Truth-telling is an equilibrium
largely because the buyers have no affirmative incentive to deviate from telling the truth.
But it should be emphasized that they have no great commitment to the truth either.
Because the mediator is only passing on an imprecise signal, a buyer is indifferent between
reporting any number within the two relevant ranges (greater than 50 and less than 50).
Low valuing buyers' indifference, however, includes any possible alternative report.
Because they know that they will never trade in equilibrium, and because they can
costlessly receive offers in this model, they would be indifferent about even inducing sellers
to waste an offer by reporting a reservation price greater than 50. This latter problem of
non-uniqueness could be fairly easily corrected by small modifications to the model (e.g.,
adding acceptance costs for buyers, not allowing sellers a "no-offer" option in the
continuation game of the mediated mechanism, etc.). Because the parties are indifferent
between reporting a wide number of values, truth-telling is an equilibrium because no
party would have an affirmative incentive to deviate from such a proposed equilibrium.
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